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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

ircd:Ⓜ️:request: Use conf items for buffer sizes and limits.

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This commit is contained in:
Jason Volk 2019-02-06 02:21:28 -08:00
parent 4da523ddf9
commit 9bd86e7f69
2 changed files with 38 additions and 17 deletions
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4
include/ircd/m/request.h
View file

@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ struct ircd::m::request
{
struct x_matrix;
static const size_t headers_max;
static conf::item<size_t> generate_content_max;
static conf::item<size_t> verify_content_max;
static bool verify(const ed25519::pk &, const ed25519::sig &, const json::object &);
bool verify(const ed25519::pk &, const ed25519::sig &) const;
bool verify(const string_view &key, const string_view &sig) const;

51
ircd/m.cc
View file

@ -3556,14 +3556,19 @@ ircd::m::request::request(const string_view &origin,
json::get<"content"_>(*this) = content;
}
decltype(ircd::m::request::headers_max)
ircd::m::request::headers_max
{
32UL
};
ircd::string_view
ircd::m::request::operator()(const mutable_buffer &out,
const vector_view<const http::header> &addl_headers)
const
{
const ctx::critical_assertion ca;
static const size_t headers_max{32};
thread_local http::header header[headers_max];
const ctx::critical_assertion ca;
size_t headers{0};
header[headers++] =
@ -3612,25 +3617,31 @@ const
return sb.completed();
}
decltype(ircd::m::request::generate_content_max)
ircd::m::request::generate_content_max
{
{ "name", "ircd.m.request.generate.content_max" },
{ "default", long(1_MiB) },
};
ircd::string_view
ircd::m::request::generate(const mutable_buffer &out,
const ed25519::sk &sk,
const string_view &pkid)
const
{
static const size_t request_content_max
const ctx::critical_assertion ca;
thread_local unique_buffer<mutable_buffer> buf
{
1_MiB
size_t(generate_content_max)
};
const ctx::critical_assertion ca;
thread_local char buf[request_content_max];
if(unlikely(json::serialized(*this) > sizeof(buf)))
if(unlikely(json::serialized(*this) > buffer::size(buf)))
throw m::error
{
"M_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE", "This server generated a request of %zu bytes; limit is %zu",
json::serialized(*this),
sizeof(buf)
buffer::size(buf)
};
const json::object object
@ -3691,16 +3702,18 @@ const
return verified;
}
decltype(ircd::m::request::verify_content_max)
ircd::m::request::verify_content_max
{
{ "name", "ircd.m.request.verify.content_max" },
{ "default", long(1_MiB) },
};
bool
ircd::m::request::verify(const ed25519::pk &pk,
const ed25519::sig &sig)
const
{
static const size_t request_max
{
1_MiB
};
// Matrix spec sez that an empty content object {} is excluded entirely
// from the verification. Our JSON only excludes members if they evaluate
// to undefined i.e json::object{}/string_view{} but not json::object{"{}"}
@ -3710,20 +3723,24 @@ const
if(empty(json::get<"content"_>(*this)))
json::get<"content"_>(_this) = json::object{};
const ctx::critical_assertion ca;
thread_local unique_buffer<mutable_buffer> buf
{
size_t(verify_content_max)
};
const size_t request_size
{
json::serialized(_this)
};
const ctx::critical_assertion ca;
thread_local char buf[request_max];
if(unlikely(request_size > sizeof(buf)))
if(unlikely(request_size > buffer::size(buf)))
throw m::error
{
http::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, "M_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE",
"The request size %zu bytes exceeds maximum of %zu bytes",
request_size,
request_max
buffer::size(buf)
};
const json::object object