Fixes compilation warning about losing const qualifier in assignment to
non-const variable
(cherry picked from commit 6d9c3f50944e1da3bf3a1be6454f85d6d6f7ab37)
This change prevents the log file paths from being leaked when
rehashing. Additionally, fname_killlog was added to two places where it
was previously forgotten.
This change prevents conf strings from being leaked when resetting the
conf to default prior to a rehash. Additionally, some default strings
are now rb_strdup'd into the ConfigFileEntry structure after loading the
conf so that they aren't allocated and then immediately freed by the
conf loading process.
The MASK_IP case in log_client_name() was broken (because of a missing
break, it behaved as HIDE_IP). However, log_client_name() with MASK_IP
does not make sense anyway and is not used.
If a listening port cannot be opened, send error messages to opers with
snomask +s and ircd.log, instead of snomask +d and the ioerror log, which
both are usually disabled.
Also, restore information about what listener is having problems. This
was lost when report_error() was replaced.
Charybdis currently leaks about 45-50k per configuration parse,
including every rehash. This change plugs these leaks by properly
iterating through all conf_parm_t structures to seek all strings that
should be freed and also by freeing the conf_parm_t structures
themselves.
These leaks have been present since the original rewrite of the
configuration parsing system in ircd-ratbox r11953.
Additionally, this change also cleans up and documents the parsing code
a bit.
SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION was presumably added in an attempt to prevent
information leakage in a manner similar to recent attacks on HTTPS.
However, assuming that IRC is vulnerable to the same class of attacks is
incorrect: the behavior of the IRC protocol (a single long-running
connection) is not the same as that of HTTPS (multiple ephemeral
connections). HTTPS's use of ephemeral connections means that certain
assumptions can be made about the contents of the compression
algorithm's dictionaries and the content exchanged between the client
and server (e.g. the content being nearly the same for each connection),
which is not true for IRC. Additionally, they rely on the attacker being
able to coerce the client into creating many HTTPS connections (and
resending some secret token belonging to the user, along with
attacker-controlled data) each time, none of which is possible with IRC.
Lastly, since compression is no longer performed, this option will
result in leaking the lengths of messages transmitted to and from the
client. This option does reduce CPU utilization on Charybdis servers but
also increases bandwidth consumed.
