mirror of
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea
synced 2024-11-18 07:52:03 +01:00
c5a408df05
Upgrade Bluemonday to latest version Signed-off-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net> Co-authored-by: 6543 <6543@obermui.de>
1102 lines
28 KiB
Go
Vendored
1102 lines
28 KiB
Go
Vendored
// Copyright (c) 2014, David Kitchen <david@buro9.com>
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//
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// All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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//
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// * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
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// list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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//
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// * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
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// this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
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// and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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//
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// * Neither the name of the organisation (Microcosm) nor the names of its
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// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
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// this software without specific prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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// AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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// IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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// DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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// FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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// DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
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// SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
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// CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
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// OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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package bluemonday
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import (
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"bytes"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/url"
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"regexp"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"golang.org/x/net/html"
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"github.com/aymerick/douceur/parser"
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)
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var (
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dataAttribute = regexp.MustCompile("^data-.+")
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dataAttributeXMLPrefix = regexp.MustCompile("^xml.+")
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dataAttributeInvalidChars = regexp.MustCompile("[A-Z;]+")
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cssUnicodeChar = regexp.MustCompile(`\\[0-9a-f]{1,6} ?`)
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dataURIbase64Prefix = regexp.MustCompile(`^data:[^,]*;base64,`)
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)
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// Sanitize takes a string that contains a HTML fragment or document and applies
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// the given policy allowlist.
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//
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// It returns a HTML string that has been sanitized by the policy or an empty
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// string if an error has occurred (most likely as a consequence of extremely
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// malformed input)
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func (p *Policy) Sanitize(s string) string {
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if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
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return s
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}
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return p.sanitizeWithBuff(strings.NewReader(s)).String()
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}
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// SanitizeBytes takes a []byte that contains a HTML fragment or document and applies
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// the given policy allowlist.
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//
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// It returns a []byte containing the HTML that has been sanitized by the policy
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// or an empty []byte if an error has occurred (most likely as a consequence of
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// extremely malformed input)
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func (p *Policy) SanitizeBytes(b []byte) []byte {
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if len(bytes.TrimSpace(b)) == 0 {
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return b
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}
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return p.sanitizeWithBuff(bytes.NewReader(b)).Bytes()
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}
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// SanitizeReader takes an io.Reader that contains a HTML fragment or document
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// and applies the given policy allowlist.
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//
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// It returns a bytes.Buffer containing the HTML that has been sanitized by the
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// policy. Errors during sanitization will merely return an empty result.
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func (p *Policy) SanitizeReader(r io.Reader) *bytes.Buffer {
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return p.sanitizeWithBuff(r)
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}
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// SanitizeReaderToWriter takes an io.Reader that contains a HTML fragment or document
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// and applies the given policy allowlist and writes to the provided writer returning
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// an error if there is one.
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func (p *Policy) SanitizeReaderToWriter(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) error {
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return p.sanitize(r, w)
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}
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const escapedURLChars = "'<>\"\r"
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func escapeUrlComponent(w stringWriterWriter, val string) error {
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i := strings.IndexAny(val, escapedURLChars)
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for i != -1 {
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if _, err := w.WriteString(val[:i]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var esc string
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switch val[i] {
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case '\'':
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// "'" is shorter than "'" and apos was not in HTML until HTML5.
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esc = "'"
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case '<':
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esc = "<"
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case '>':
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esc = ">"
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case '"':
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// """ is shorter than """.
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esc = """
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case '\r':
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esc = " "
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default:
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panic("unrecognized escape character")
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}
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val = val[i+1:]
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if _, err := w.WriteString(esc); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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i = strings.IndexAny(val, escapedURLChars)
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}
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_, err := w.WriteString(val)
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return err
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}
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// Query represents a single part of the query string, a query param
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type Query struct {
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Key string
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Value string
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HasValue bool
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}
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func parseQuery(query string) (values []Query, err error) {
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// This is essentially a copy of parseQuery from
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// https://golang.org/src/net/url/url.go but adjusted to build our values
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// based on our type, which we need to preserve the ordering of the query
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// string
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for query != "" {
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key := query
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if i := strings.IndexAny(key, "&;"); i >= 0 {
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key, query = key[:i], key[i+1:]
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} else {
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query = ""
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}
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if key == "" {
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continue
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}
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value := ""
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hasValue := false
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if i := strings.Index(key, "="); i >= 0 {
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key, value = key[:i], key[i+1:]
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hasValue = true
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}
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key, err1 := url.QueryUnescape(key)
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if err1 != nil {
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if err == nil {
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err = err1
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}
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continue
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}
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value, err1 = url.QueryUnescape(value)
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if err1 != nil {
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if err == nil {
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err = err1
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}
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continue
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}
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values = append(values, Query{
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Key: key,
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Value: value,
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HasValue: hasValue,
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})
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}
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return values, err
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}
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func encodeQueries(queries []Query) string {
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var buff bytes.Buffer
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for i, query := range queries {
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buff.WriteString(url.QueryEscape(query.Key))
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if query.HasValue {
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buff.WriteString("=")
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buff.WriteString(url.QueryEscape(query.Value))
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}
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if i < len(queries)-1 {
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buff.WriteString("&")
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}
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}
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return buff.String()
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}
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func sanitizedURL(val string) (string, error) {
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u, err := url.Parse(val)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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// we use parseQuery but not u.Query to keep the order not change because
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// url.Values is a map which has a random order.
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queryValues, err := parseQuery(u.RawQuery)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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// sanitize the url query params
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for i, query := range queryValues {
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queryValues[i].Key = html.EscapeString(query.Key)
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}
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u.RawQuery = encodeQueries(queryValues)
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// u.String() will also sanitize host/scheme/user/pass
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return u.String(), nil
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}
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// Performs the actual sanitization process.
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func (p *Policy) sanitizeWithBuff(r io.Reader) *bytes.Buffer {
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var buff bytes.Buffer
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if err := p.sanitize(r, &buff); err != nil {
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return &bytes.Buffer{}
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}
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return &buff
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}
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type asStringWriter struct {
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io.Writer
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}
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func (a *asStringWriter) WriteString(s string) (int, error) {
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return a.Write([]byte(s))
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}
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func (p *Policy) sanitize(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) error {
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// It is possible that the developer has created the policy via:
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// p := bluemonday.Policy{}
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// rather than:
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// p := bluemonday.NewPolicy()
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// If this is the case, and if they haven't yet triggered an action that
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// would initiliaze the maps, then we need to do that.
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p.init()
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buff, ok := w.(stringWriterWriter)
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if !ok {
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buff = &asStringWriter{w}
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}
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var (
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skipElementContent bool
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skippingElementsCount int64
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skipClosingTag bool
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closingTagToSkipStack []string
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mostRecentlyStartedToken string
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)
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tokenizer := html.NewTokenizer(r)
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for {
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if tokenizer.Next() == html.ErrorToken {
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err := tokenizer.Err()
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if err == io.EOF {
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// End of input means end of processing
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return nil
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}
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// Raw tokenizer error
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return err
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}
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token := tokenizer.Token()
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switch token.Type {
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case html.DoctypeToken:
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// DocType is not handled as there is no safe parsing mechanism
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// provided by golang.org/x/net/html for the content, and this can
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// be misused to insert HTML tags that are not then sanitized
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//
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// One might wish to recursively sanitize here using the same policy
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// but I will need to do some further testing before considering
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// this.
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case html.CommentToken:
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// Comments are ignored by default
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if p.allowComments {
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// But if allowed then write the comment out as-is
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buff.WriteString(token.String())
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}
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case html.StartTagToken:
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mostRecentlyStartedToken = normaliseElementName(token.Data)
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switch normaliseElementName(token.Data) {
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case `script`:
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if !p.allowUnsafe {
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continue
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}
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case `style`:
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if !p.allowUnsafe {
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continue
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}
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}
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aps, ok := p.elsAndAttrs[token.Data]
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if !ok {
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aa, matched := p.matchRegex(token.Data)
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if !matched {
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if _, ok := p.setOfElementsToSkipContent[token.Data]; ok {
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skipElementContent = true
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skippingElementsCount++
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}
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if p.addSpaces {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(" "); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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break
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}
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aps = aa
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}
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if len(token.Attr) != 0 {
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token.Attr = escapeAttributes(
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p.sanitizeAttrs(token.Data, token.Attr, aps),
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)
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}
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if len(token.Attr) == 0 {
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if !p.allowNoAttrs(token.Data) {
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skipClosingTag = true
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closingTagToSkipStack = append(closingTagToSkipStack, token.Data)
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if p.addSpaces {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(" "); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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break
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}
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}
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if !skipElementContent {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(token.String()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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case html.EndTagToken:
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if mostRecentlyStartedToken == normaliseElementName(token.Data) {
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mostRecentlyStartedToken = ""
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}
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switch normaliseElementName(token.Data) {
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case `script`:
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if !p.allowUnsafe {
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continue
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}
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case `style`:
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if !p.allowUnsafe {
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continue
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}
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}
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if skipClosingTag && closingTagToSkipStack[len(closingTagToSkipStack)-1] == token.Data {
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closingTagToSkipStack = closingTagToSkipStack[:len(closingTagToSkipStack)-1]
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if len(closingTagToSkipStack) == 0 {
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skipClosingTag = false
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}
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if p.addSpaces {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(" "); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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break
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}
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if _, ok := p.elsAndAttrs[token.Data]; !ok {
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match := false
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for regex := range p.elsMatchingAndAttrs {
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if regex.MatchString(token.Data) {
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skipElementContent = false
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match = true
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break
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}
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}
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if _, ok := p.setOfElementsToSkipContent[token.Data]; ok && !match {
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skippingElementsCount--
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if skippingElementsCount == 0 {
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skipElementContent = false
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}
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}
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if !match {
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if p.addSpaces {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(" "); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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break
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}
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}
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if !skipElementContent {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(token.String()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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case html.SelfClosingTagToken:
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switch normaliseElementName(token.Data) {
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case `script`:
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if !p.allowUnsafe {
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continue
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}
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case `style`:
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if !p.allowUnsafe {
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continue
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}
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}
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aps, ok := p.elsAndAttrs[token.Data]
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if !ok {
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aa, matched := p.matchRegex(token.Data)
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if !matched {
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if p.addSpaces && !matched {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(" "); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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break
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}
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aps = aa
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}
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if len(token.Attr) != 0 {
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token.Attr = escapeAttributes(p.sanitizeAttrs(token.Data, token.Attr, aps))
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}
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if len(token.Attr) == 0 && !p.allowNoAttrs(token.Data) {
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if p.addSpaces {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(" "); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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break
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}
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}
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if !skipElementContent {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(token.String()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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case html.TextToken:
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if !skipElementContent {
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switch mostRecentlyStartedToken {
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case `script`:
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// not encouraged, but if a policy allows JavaScript we
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// should not HTML escape it as that would break the output
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//
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// requires p.AllowUnsafe()
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if p.allowUnsafe {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(token.Data); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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case "style":
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// not encouraged, but if a policy allows CSS styles we
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// should not HTML escape it as that would break the output
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//
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// requires p.AllowUnsafe()
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if p.allowUnsafe {
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(token.Data); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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default:
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// HTML escape the text
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if _, err := buff.WriteString(token.String()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
|
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}
|
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}
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default:
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// A token that didn't exist in the html package when we wrote this
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return fmt.Errorf("unknown token: %v", token)
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}
|
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}
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}
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|
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// sanitizeAttrs takes a set of element attribute policies and the global
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// attribute policies and applies them to the []html.Attribute returning a set
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// of html.Attributes that match the policies
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func (p *Policy) sanitizeAttrs(
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elementName string,
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attrs []html.Attribute,
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aps map[string][]attrPolicy,
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) []html.Attribute {
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|
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if len(attrs) == 0 {
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return attrs
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}
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|
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hasStylePolicies := false
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sps, elementHasStylePolicies := p.elsAndStyles[elementName]
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if len(p.globalStyles) > 0 || (elementHasStylePolicies && len(sps) > 0) {
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hasStylePolicies = true
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}
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// no specific element policy found, look for a pattern match
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if !hasStylePolicies {
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for k, v := range p.elsMatchingAndStyles {
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if k.MatchString(elementName) {
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if len(v) > 0 {
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hasStylePolicies = true
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break
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}
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}
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}
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}
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|
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// Builds a new attribute slice based on the whether the attribute has been
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// allowed explicitly or globally.
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cleanAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
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attrsLoop:
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for _, htmlAttr := range attrs {
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if p.allowDataAttributes {
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// If we see a data attribute, let it through.
|
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if isDataAttribute(htmlAttr.Key) {
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cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
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continue
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}
|
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}
|
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// Is this a "style" attribute, and if so, do we need to sanitize it?
|
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if htmlAttr.Key == "style" && hasStylePolicies {
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htmlAttr = p.sanitizeStyles(htmlAttr, elementName)
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if htmlAttr.Val == "" {
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// We've sanitized away any and all styles; don't bother to
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// output the style attribute (even if it's allowed)
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continue
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} else {
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cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
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continue
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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// Is there an element specific attribute policy that applies?
|
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if apl, ok := aps[htmlAttr.Key]; ok {
|
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for _, ap := range apl {
|
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if ap.regexp != nil {
|
|
if ap.regexp.MatchString(htmlAttr.Val) {
|
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cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
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continue attrsLoop
|
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}
|
|
} else {
|
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cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
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continue attrsLoop
|
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}
|
|
}
|
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}
|
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|
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// Is there a global attribute policy that applies?
|
|
if apl, ok := p.globalAttrs[htmlAttr.Key]; ok {
|
|
for _, ap := range apl {
|
|
if ap.regexp != nil {
|
|
if ap.regexp.MatchString(htmlAttr.Val) {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val = escapeAttribute(htmlAttr.Val)
|
|
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val = escapeAttribute(htmlAttr.Val)
|
|
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(cleanAttrs) == 0 {
|
|
// If nothing was allowed, let's get out of here
|
|
return cleanAttrs
|
|
}
|
|
// cleanAttrs now contains the attributes that are permitted
|
|
|
|
if linkable(elementName) {
|
|
if p.requireParseableURLs {
|
|
// Ensure URLs are parseable:
|
|
// - a.href
|
|
// - area.href
|
|
// - link.href
|
|
// - blockquote.cite
|
|
// - q.cite
|
|
// - img.src
|
|
// - script.src
|
|
tmpAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
|
|
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
|
|
switch elementName {
|
|
case "a", "area", "base", "link":
|
|
if htmlAttr.Key == "href" {
|
|
if u, ok := p.validURL(htmlAttr.Val); ok {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val = u
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
case "blockquote", "del", "ins", "q":
|
|
if htmlAttr.Key == "cite" {
|
|
if u, ok := p.validURL(htmlAttr.Val); ok {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val = u
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
case "audio", "embed", "iframe", "img", "script", "source", "track", "video":
|
|
if htmlAttr.Key == "src" {
|
|
if u, ok := p.validURL(htmlAttr.Val); ok {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val = u
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
default:
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
cleanAttrs = tmpAttrs
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p.requireNoFollow ||
|
|
p.requireNoFollowFullyQualifiedLinks ||
|
|
p.requireNoReferrer ||
|
|
p.requireNoReferrerFullyQualifiedLinks ||
|
|
p.addTargetBlankToFullyQualifiedLinks) &&
|
|
len(cleanAttrs) > 0 {
|
|
|
|
// Add rel="nofollow" if a "href" exists
|
|
switch elementName {
|
|
case "a", "area", "base", "link":
|
|
var hrefFound bool
|
|
var externalLink bool
|
|
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
|
|
if htmlAttr.Key == "href" {
|
|
hrefFound = true
|
|
|
|
u, err := url.Parse(htmlAttr.Val)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if u.Host != "" {
|
|
externalLink = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hrefFound {
|
|
var (
|
|
noFollowFound bool
|
|
noReferrerFound bool
|
|
targetBlankFound bool
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
addNoFollow := (p.requireNoFollow ||
|
|
externalLink && p.requireNoFollowFullyQualifiedLinks)
|
|
|
|
addNoReferrer := (p.requireNoReferrer ||
|
|
externalLink && p.requireNoReferrerFullyQualifiedLinks)
|
|
|
|
addTargetBlank := (externalLink &&
|
|
p.addTargetBlankToFullyQualifiedLinks)
|
|
|
|
tmpAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
|
|
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
|
|
|
|
var appended bool
|
|
if htmlAttr.Key == "rel" && (addNoFollow || addNoReferrer) {
|
|
|
|
if addNoFollow && !strings.Contains(htmlAttr.Val, "nofollow") {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val += " nofollow"
|
|
}
|
|
if addNoReferrer && !strings.Contains(htmlAttr.Val, "noreferrer") {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val += " noreferrer"
|
|
}
|
|
noFollowFound = addNoFollow
|
|
noReferrerFound = addNoReferrer
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
appended = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if elementName == "a" && htmlAttr.Key == "target" {
|
|
if htmlAttr.Val == "_blank" {
|
|
targetBlankFound = true
|
|
}
|
|
if addTargetBlank && !targetBlankFound {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val = "_blank"
|
|
targetBlankFound = true
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
appended = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !appended {
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if noFollowFound || noReferrerFound || targetBlankFound {
|
|
cleanAttrs = tmpAttrs
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (addNoFollow && !noFollowFound) || (addNoReferrer && !noReferrerFound) {
|
|
rel := html.Attribute{}
|
|
rel.Key = "rel"
|
|
if addNoFollow {
|
|
rel.Val = "nofollow"
|
|
}
|
|
if addNoReferrer {
|
|
if rel.Val != "" {
|
|
rel.Val += " "
|
|
}
|
|
rel.Val += "noreferrer"
|
|
}
|
|
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, rel)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if elementName == "a" && addTargetBlank && !targetBlankFound {
|
|
rel := html.Attribute{}
|
|
rel.Key = "target"
|
|
rel.Val = "_blank"
|
|
targetBlankFound = true
|
|
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, rel)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if targetBlankFound {
|
|
// target="_blank" has a security risk that allows the
|
|
// opened window/tab to issue JavaScript calls against
|
|
// window.opener, which in effect allow the destination
|
|
// of the link to control the source:
|
|
// https://dev.to/ben/the-targetblank-vulnerability-by-example
|
|
//
|
|
// To mitigate this risk, we need to add a specific rel
|
|
// attribute if it is not already present.
|
|
// rel="noopener"
|
|
//
|
|
// Unfortunately this is processing the rel twice (we
|
|
// already looked at it earlier ^^) as we cannot be sure
|
|
// of the ordering of the href and rel, and whether we
|
|
// have fully satisfied that we need to do this. This
|
|
// double processing only happens *if* target="_blank"
|
|
// is true.
|
|
var noOpenerAdded bool
|
|
tmpAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
|
|
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
|
|
var appended bool
|
|
if htmlAttr.Key == "rel" {
|
|
if strings.Contains(htmlAttr.Val, "noopener") {
|
|
noOpenerAdded = true
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
} else {
|
|
htmlAttr.Val += " noopener"
|
|
noOpenerAdded = true
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
appended = true
|
|
}
|
|
if !appended {
|
|
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if noOpenerAdded {
|
|
cleanAttrs = tmpAttrs
|
|
} else {
|
|
// rel attr was not found, or else noopener would
|
|
// have been added already
|
|
rel := html.Attribute{}
|
|
rel.Key = "rel"
|
|
rel.Val = "noopener"
|
|
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, rel)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.requireCrossOriginAnonymous && len(cleanAttrs) > 0 {
|
|
switch elementName {
|
|
case "audio", "img", "link", "script", "video":
|
|
var crossOriginFound bool
|
|
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
|
|
if htmlAttr.Key == "crossorigin" {
|
|
crossOriginFound = true
|
|
htmlAttr.Val = "anonymous"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !crossOriginFound {
|
|
crossOrigin := html.Attribute{}
|
|
crossOrigin.Key = "crossorigin"
|
|
crossOrigin.Val = "anonymous"
|
|
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, crossOrigin)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return cleanAttrs
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) sanitizeStyles(attr html.Attribute, elementName string) html.Attribute {
|
|
sps := p.elsAndStyles[elementName]
|
|
if len(sps) == 0 {
|
|
sps = map[string][]stylePolicy{}
|
|
// check for any matching elements, if we don't already have a policy found
|
|
// if multiple matches are found they will be overwritten, it's best
|
|
// to not have overlapping matchers
|
|
for regex, policies := range p.elsMatchingAndStyles {
|
|
if regex.MatchString(elementName) {
|
|
for k, v := range policies {
|
|
sps[k] = append(sps[k], v...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//Add semi-colon to end to fix parsing issue
|
|
if len(attr.Val) > 0 && attr.Val[len(attr.Val)-1] != ';' {
|
|
attr.Val = attr.Val + ";"
|
|
}
|
|
decs, err := parser.ParseDeclarations(attr.Val)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
attr.Val = ""
|
|
return attr
|
|
}
|
|
clean := []string{}
|
|
prefixes := []string{"-webkit-", "-moz-", "-ms-", "-o-", "mso-", "-xv-", "-atsc-", "-wap-", "-khtml-", "prince-", "-ah-", "-hp-", "-ro-", "-rim-", "-tc-"}
|
|
|
|
decLoop:
|
|
for _, dec := range decs {
|
|
tempProperty := strings.ToLower(dec.Property)
|
|
tempValue := removeUnicode(strings.ToLower(dec.Value))
|
|
for _, i := range prefixes {
|
|
tempProperty = strings.TrimPrefix(tempProperty, i)
|
|
}
|
|
if spl, ok := sps[tempProperty]; ok {
|
|
for _, sp := range spl {
|
|
if sp.handler != nil {
|
|
if sp.handler(tempValue) {
|
|
clean = append(clean, dec.Property+": "+dec.Value)
|
|
continue decLoop
|
|
}
|
|
} else if len(sp.enum) > 0 {
|
|
if stringInSlice(tempValue, sp.enum) {
|
|
clean = append(clean, dec.Property+": "+dec.Value)
|
|
continue decLoop
|
|
}
|
|
} else if sp.regexp != nil {
|
|
if sp.regexp.MatchString(tempValue) {
|
|
clean = append(clean, dec.Property+": "+dec.Value)
|
|
continue decLoop
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if spl, ok := p.globalStyles[tempProperty]; ok {
|
|
for _, sp := range spl {
|
|
if sp.handler != nil {
|
|
if sp.handler(tempValue) {
|
|
clean = append(clean, dec.Property+": "+dec.Value)
|
|
continue decLoop
|
|
}
|
|
} else if len(sp.enum) > 0 {
|
|
if stringInSlice(tempValue, sp.enum) {
|
|
clean = append(clean, dec.Property+": "+dec.Value)
|
|
continue decLoop
|
|
}
|
|
} else if sp.regexp != nil {
|
|
if sp.regexp.MatchString(tempValue) {
|
|
clean = append(clean, dec.Property+": "+dec.Value)
|
|
continue decLoop
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(clean) > 0 {
|
|
attr.Val = strings.Join(clean, "; ")
|
|
} else {
|
|
attr.Val = ""
|
|
}
|
|
return attr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) allowNoAttrs(elementName string) bool {
|
|
_, ok := p.setOfElementsAllowedWithoutAttrs[elementName]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
for _, r := range p.setOfElementsMatchingAllowedWithoutAttrs {
|
|
if r.MatchString(elementName) {
|
|
ok = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) validURL(rawurl string) (string, bool) {
|
|
if p.requireParseableURLs {
|
|
// URLs are valid if when space is trimmed the URL is valid
|
|
rawurl = strings.TrimSpace(rawurl)
|
|
|
|
// URLs cannot contain whitespace, unless it is a data-uri
|
|
if strings.Contains(rawurl, " ") ||
|
|
strings.Contains(rawurl, "\t") ||
|
|
strings.Contains(rawurl, "\n") {
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(rawurl, `data:`) {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Remove \r and \n from base64 encoded data to pass url.Parse.
|
|
matched := dataURIbase64Prefix.FindString(rawurl)
|
|
if matched != "" {
|
|
rawurl = matched + strings.Replace(
|
|
strings.Replace(
|
|
rawurl[len(matched):],
|
|
"\r",
|
|
"",
|
|
-1,
|
|
),
|
|
"\n",
|
|
"",
|
|
-1,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// URLs are valid if they parse
|
|
u, err := url.Parse(rawurl)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if u.Scheme != "" {
|
|
|
|
urlPolicies, ok := p.allowURLSchemes[u.Scheme]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(urlPolicies) == 0 {
|
|
return u.String(), true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, urlPolicy := range urlPolicies {
|
|
if urlPolicy(u) == true {
|
|
return u.String(), true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.allowRelativeURLs {
|
|
if u.String() != "" {
|
|
return u.String(), true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rawurl, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func linkable(elementName string) bool {
|
|
switch elementName {
|
|
case "a", "area", "base", "link":
|
|
// elements that allow .href
|
|
return true
|
|
case "blockquote", "del", "ins", "q":
|
|
// elements that allow .cite
|
|
return true
|
|
case "audio", "embed", "iframe", "img", "input", "script", "track", "video":
|
|
// elements that allow .src
|
|
return true
|
|
default:
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// stringInSlice returns true if needle exists in haystack
|
|
func stringInSlice(needle string, haystack []string) bool {
|
|
for _, straw := range haystack {
|
|
if strings.ToLower(straw) == strings.ToLower(needle) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isDataAttribute(val string) bool {
|
|
if !dataAttribute.MatchString(val) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
rest := strings.Split(val, "data-")
|
|
if len(rest) == 1 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// data-xml* is invalid.
|
|
if dataAttributeXMLPrefix.MatchString(rest[1]) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// no uppercase or semi-colons allowed.
|
|
if dataAttributeInvalidChars.MatchString(rest[1]) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func removeUnicode(value string) string {
|
|
substitutedValue := value
|
|
currentLoc := cssUnicodeChar.FindStringIndex(substitutedValue)
|
|
for currentLoc != nil {
|
|
|
|
character := substitutedValue[currentLoc[0]+1 : currentLoc[1]]
|
|
character = strings.TrimSpace(character)
|
|
if len(character) < 4 {
|
|
character = strings.Repeat("0", 4-len(character)) + character
|
|
} else {
|
|
for len(character) > 4 {
|
|
if character[0] != '0' {
|
|
character = ""
|
|
break
|
|
} else {
|
|
character = character[1:]
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
character = "\\u" + character
|
|
translatedChar, err := strconv.Unquote(`"` + character + `"`)
|
|
translatedChar = strings.TrimSpace(translatedChar)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
substitutedValue = substitutedValue[0:currentLoc[0]] + translatedChar + substitutedValue[currentLoc[1]:]
|
|
currentLoc = cssUnicodeChar.FindStringIndex(substitutedValue)
|
|
}
|
|
return substitutedValue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) matchRegex(elementName string) (map[string][]attrPolicy, bool) {
|
|
aps := make(map[string][]attrPolicy, 0)
|
|
matched := false
|
|
for regex, attrs := range p.elsMatchingAndAttrs {
|
|
if regex.MatchString(elementName) {
|
|
matched = true
|
|
for k, v := range attrs {
|
|
aps[k] = append(aps[k], v...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return aps, matched
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// normaliseElementName takes a HTML element like <script> which is user input
|
|
// and returns a lower case version of it that is immune to UTF-8 to ASCII
|
|
// conversion tricks (like the use of upper case cyrillic i scrİpt which a
|
|
// strings.ToLower would convert to script). Instead this func will preserve
|
|
// all non-ASCII as their escaped equivalent, i.e. \u0130 which reveals the
|
|
// characters when lower cased
|
|
func normaliseElementName(str string) string {
|
|
// that useful QuoteToASCII put quote marks at the start and end
|
|
// so those are trimmed off
|
|
return strings.TrimSuffix(
|
|
strings.TrimPrefix(
|
|
strings.ToLower(
|
|
strconv.QuoteToASCII(str),
|
|
),
|
|
`"`),
|
|
`"`,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func escapeAttributes(attrs []html.Attribute) []html.Attribute {
|
|
escapedAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
|
|
for _, attr := range attrs {
|
|
attr.Val = escapeAttribute(attr.Val)
|
|
escapedAttrs = append(escapedAttrs, attr)
|
|
}
|
|
return escapedAttrs
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func escapeAttribute(val string) string {
|
|
val = strings.Replace(val, string([]rune{'\u00A0'}), ` `, -1)
|
|
val = strings.Replace(val, `"`, `"`, -1)
|
|
return val
|
|
}
|