Remove signal DoubleSpendDetected, use function
Also removes the need for forward reference to RelayableRespend.
This commit is contained in:
Tom Harding
parent
88dd3598d2
commit
0da6b3fd18
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@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup)
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LogPrintf("mapAddressBook.size() = %u\n", pwalletMain ? pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.size() : 0);
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#endif
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RegisterInternalSignals();
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InitRespendFilter();
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StartNode(threadGroup);
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if (fServer)
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StartRPCThreads();
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103
src/main.cpp
103
src/main.cpp
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@ -125,9 +125,14 @@ namespace {
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} // anon namespace
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// Forward reference functions defined here:
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// Bloom filter to limit respend relays to one
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static const unsigned int MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM = 1000;
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static bool RelayableRespend(const COutPoint& outPoint, const CTransaction& doubleSpend, bool fInBlock, CBloomFilter& filter);
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static CBloomFilter doubleSpendFilter;
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void InitRespendFilter() {
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seed_insecure_rand();
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doubleSpendFilter = CBloomFilter(MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM, 0.01, insecure_rand(), BLOOM_UPDATE_NONE);
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}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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//
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@ -151,24 +156,10 @@ struct CMainSignals {
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boost::signals2::signal<void (const uint256 &)> Inventory;
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// Tells listeners to broadcast their data.
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boost::signals2::signal<void ()> Broadcast;
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// Notifies listeners of detection of a double-spent transaction. Arguments are outpoint that is
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// double-spent, first transaction seen, double-spend transaction, and whether the second double-spend
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// transaction was first seen in a block.
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// Note: only notifies if the previous transaction is in the memory pool; if previous transction was in a block,
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// then the double-spend simply fails when we try to lookup the inputs in the current UTXO set.
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boost::signals2::signal<bool (const COutPoint&, const CTransaction&, bool)> DetectedDoubleSpend;
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} g_signals;
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} // anon namespace
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void RegisterInternalSignals() {
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static CBloomFilter doubleSpendFilter;
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seed_insecure_rand();
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doubleSpendFilter = CBloomFilter(MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM, 0.01, insecure_rand(), BLOOM_UPDATE_NONE);
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g_signals.DetectedDoubleSpend.connect(boost::bind(RelayableRespend, _1, _2, _3, doubleSpendFilter));
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}
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void RegisterWallet(CWalletInterface* pwalletIn) {
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g_signals.SyncTransaction.connect(boost::bind(&CWalletInterface::SyncTransaction, pwalletIn, _1, _2));
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@ -908,6 +899,45 @@ bool RateLimitExceeded(double& dCount, int64_t& nLastTime, int64_t nLimit, unsig
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return false;
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}
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static bool RelayableRespend(const COutPoint& outPoint, const CTransaction& doubleSpend, bool fInBlock, CBloomFilter& filter)
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{
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// Relaying double-spend attempts to our peers lets them detect when
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// somebody might be trying to cheat them. However, blindly relaying
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// every double-spend across the entire network gives attackers
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// a denial-of-service attack: just generate a stream of double-spends
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// re-spending the same (limited) set of outpoints owned by the attacker.
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// So, we use a bloom filter and only relay (at most) the first double
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// spend for each outpoint. False-positives ("we have already relayed")
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// are OK, because if the peer doesn't hear about the double-spend
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// from us they are very likely to hear about it from another peer, since
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// each peer uses a different, randomized bloom filter.
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if (fInBlock || filter.contains(outPoint)) return false;
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// Apply an independent rate limit to double-spend relays
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static double dRespendCount;
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static int64_t nLastRespendTime;
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static int64_t nRespendLimit = GetArg("-limitrespendrelay", 100);
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unsigned int nSize = ::GetSerializeSize(doubleSpend, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
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if (RateLimitExceeded(dRespendCount, nLastRespendTime, nRespendLimit, nSize))
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{
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LogPrint("mempool", "Double-spend relay rejected by rate limiter\n");
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return false;
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}
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LogPrint("mempool", "Rate limit dRespendCount: %g => %g\n", dRespendCount, dRespendCount+nSize);
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// Clear the filter on average every MAX_DOUBLE_SPEND_BLOOM
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// insertions
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if (insecure_rand()%MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM == 0)
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filter.clear();
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filter.insert(outPoint);
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return true;
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}
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bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransaction &tx, bool fLimitFree,
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bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fRejectInsaneFee)
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{
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@ -945,7 +975,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
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// Does tx conflict with a member of the pool, and is it not equivalent to that member?
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if (pool.mapNextTx.count(outpoint) && !tx.IsEquivalentTo(*pool.mapNextTx[outpoint].ptx))
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{
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relayableRespend = g_signals.DetectedDoubleSpend(outpoint, tx, false);
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relayableRespend = RelayableRespend(outpoint, tx, false, doubleSpendFilter);
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if (!relayableRespend)
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return false;
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}
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@ -1057,45 +1087,6 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
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return !relayableRespend;
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}
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static bool RelayableRespend(const COutPoint& outPoint, const CTransaction& doubleSpend, bool fInBlock, CBloomFilter& filter)
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{
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// Relaying double-spend attempts to our peers lets them detect when
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// somebody might be trying to cheat them. However, blindly relaying
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// every double-spend across the entire network gives attackers
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// a denial-of-service attack: just generate a stream of double-spends
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// re-spending the same (limited) set of outpoints owned by the attacker.
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// So, we use a bloom filter and only relay (at most) the first double
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// spend for each outpoint. False-positives ("we have already relayed")
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// are OK, because if the peer doesn't hear about the double-spend
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// from us they are very likely to hear about it from another peer, since
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// each peer uses a different, randomized bloom filter.
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if (fInBlock || filter.contains(outPoint)) return false;
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// Apply an independent rate limit to double-spend relays
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static double dRespendCount;
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static int64_t nLastRespendTime;
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static int64_t nRespendLimit = GetArg("-limitrespendrelay", 100);
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unsigned int nSize = ::GetSerializeSize(doubleSpend, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
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if (RateLimitExceeded(dRespendCount, nLastRespendTime, nRespendLimit, nSize))
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{
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LogPrint("mempool", "Double-spend relay rejected by rate limiter\n");
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return false;
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}
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LogPrint("mempool", "Rate limit dRespendCount: %g => %g\n", dRespendCount, dRespendCount+nSize);
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// Clear the filter on average every MAX_DOUBLE_SPEND_BLOOM
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// insertions
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if (insecure_rand()%MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM == 0)
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filter.clear();
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filter.insert(outPoint);
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return true;
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}
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int CMerkleTx::GetDepthInMainChainINTERNAL(CBlockIndex* &pindexRet) const
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{
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@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ struct CNodeStateStats;
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struct CBlockTemplate;
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/** Set up internal signal handlers **/
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void RegisterInternalSignals();
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/** Initialize respend bloom filter **/
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void InitRespendFilter();
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/** Register a wallet to receive updates from core */
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void RegisterWallet(CWalletInterface* pwalletIn);
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