Rate limit the processing of incoming addr messages

While limitations on the influence of attackers on addrman already
exist (affected buckets are restricted to a subset based on incoming
IP / network group), there is no reason to permit them to let them
feed us addresses at more than a multiple of the normal network
rate.

This commit introduces a "token bucket" rate limiter for the
processing of addresses in incoming ADDR and ADDRV2 messages.
Every connection gets an associated token bucket. Processing an
address in an ADDR or ADDRV2 message from non-whitelisted peers
consumes a token from the bucket. If the bucket is empty, the
address is ignored (it is not forwarded or processed). The token
counter increases at a rate of 0.1 tokens per second, and will
accrue up to a maximum of 1000 tokens (the maximum we accept in a
single ADDR or ADDRV2). When a GETADDR is sent to a peer, it
immediately gets 1000 additional tokens, as we actively desire many
addresses from such peers (this may temporarily cause the token
count to exceed 1000).

The rate limit of 0.1 addr/s was chosen based on observation of
honest nodes on the network. Activity in general from most nodes
is either 0, or up to a maximum around 0.025 addr/s for recent
Bitcoin Core nodes. A few (self-identified, through subver) crawler
nodes occasionally exceed 0.1 addr/s.

Github-Pull: #22387
Rebased-From: 0d64b8f709b4655d8702f810d4876cd8d96ded82
This commit is contained in:
Pieter Wuille 2021-08-05 09:15:44 -07:00
parent 068ac69b56
commit 83dfe6c65e
5 changed files with 38 additions and 1 deletions

View file

@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ enum NetPermissionFlags {
PF_NOBAN = (1U << 4) | PF_DOWNLOAD,
// Can query the mempool
PF_MEMPOOL = (1U << 5),
// Can request addrs without hitting a privacy-preserving cache
// Can request addrs without hitting a privacy-preserving cache, and send us
// unlimited amounts of addrs.
PF_ADDR = (1U << 7),
// True if the user did not specifically set fine grained permissions

View file

@ -146,6 +146,13 @@ static constexpr uint32_t MAX_GETCFILTERS_SIZE = 1000;
static constexpr uint32_t MAX_GETCFHEADERS_SIZE = 2000;
/** the maximum percentage of addresses from our addrman to return in response to a getaddr message. */
static constexpr size_t MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND = 23;
/** The maximum rate of address records we're willing to process on average. Can be bypassed using
* the NetPermissionFlags::Addr permission. */
static constexpr double MAX_ADDR_RATE_PER_SECOND{0.1};
/** The soft limit of the address processing token bucket (the regular MAX_ADDR_RATE_PER_SECOND
* based increments won't go above this, but the MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND increment following GETADDR
* is exempt from this limit. */
static constexpr size_t MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET{MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND};
struct COrphanTx {
// When modifying, adapt the copy of this definition in tests/DoS_tests.
@ -454,6 +461,12 @@ struct Peer {
/** Work queue of items requested by this peer **/
std::deque<CInv> m_getdata_requests GUARDED_BY(m_getdata_requests_mutex);
/** Number of addr messages that can be processed from this peer. Start at 1 to
* permit self-announcement. */
double m_addr_token_bucket{1.0};
/** When m_addr_token_bucket was last updated */
std::chrono::microseconds m_addr_token_timestamp{GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>()};
Peer(NodeId id) : m_id(id) {}
};
@ -2438,6 +2451,9 @@ void PeerManager::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, CDat
// Get recent addresses
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(greatest_common_version).Make(NetMsgType::GETADDR));
pfrom.fGetAddr = true;
// When requesting a getaddr, accept an additional MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND addresses in response
// (bypassing the MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET limit).
peer->m_addr_token_bucket += MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND;
}
if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
@ -2591,11 +2607,28 @@ void PeerManager::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type, CDat
std::vector<CAddress> vAddrOk;
int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime();
int64_t nSince = nNow - 10 * 60;
// Update/increment addr rate limiting bucket.
const auto current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>();
if (peer->m_addr_token_bucket < MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET) {
// Don't increment bucket if it's already full
const auto time_diff = std::max(current_time - peer->m_addr_token_timestamp, std::chrono::microseconds{0});
const double increment = std::chrono::duration<double>(time_diff).count() * MAX_ADDR_RATE_PER_SECOND;
peer->m_addr_token_bucket = std::min<double>(peer->m_addr_token_bucket + increment, MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET);
}
peer->m_addr_token_timestamp = current_time;
const bool rate_limited = !pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::PF_ADDR);
for (CAddress& addr : vAddr)
{
if (interruptMsgProc)
return;
// Apply rate limiting.
if (rate_limited) {
if (peer->m_addr_token_bucket < 1.0) break;
peer->m_addr_token_bucket -= 1.0;
}
// We only bother storing full nodes, though this may include
// things which we would not make an outbound connection to, in
// part because we may make feeler connections to them.

View file

@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ class AddrTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
def set_test_params(self):
self.setup_clean_chain = False
self.num_nodes = 1
self.extra_args = [["-whitelist=addr@127.0.0.1"]]
def run_test(self):
self.log.info('Create connection that sends addr messages')

View file

@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ class AddrTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
def set_test_params(self):
self.setup_clean_chain = True
self.num_nodes = 1
self.extra_args = [["-whitelist=addr@127.0.0.1"]]
def run_test(self):
self.log.info('Create connection that sends addrv2 messages')

View file

@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ class InvalidMessagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
def set_test_params(self):
self.num_nodes = 1
self.setup_clean_chain = True
self.extra_args = [["-whitelist=addr@127.0.0.1"]]
def run_test(self):
self.test_buffer()