Code-signing certificates (no private keys) from Apple and Comodo
This commit is contained in:
Gavin Andresen
parent
33b377a016
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db8ca3fc2e
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@ -72,23 +72,20 @@
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rm -rf bitcoin-${VERSION}-win32
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* perform Mac build
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See this blog post for how Gavin set up his build environment to build the OSX
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release; note that a patched version of macdeployqt is not needed anymore, as
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the required functionality and fixes are implemented directly in macdeployqtplus:
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http://gavintech.blogspot.com/2011/11/deploying-bitcoin-qt-on-osx.html
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Gavin also had trouble with the macports py27-appscript package; he
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ended up installing a version that worked with: /usr/bin/easy_install-2.7 appscript
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OSX binaries are created by Gavin Andresen on a 32-bit, OSX 10.6 machine.
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qmake RELEASE=1 USE_UPNP=1 USE_QRCODE=1 bitcoin-qt.pro
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make
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export QTDIR=/opt/local/share/qt4 # needed to find translations/qt_*.qm files
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T=$(contrib/qt_translations.py $QTDIR/translations src/qt/locale)
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export CODESIGNARGS='--sign "Developer ID Application: BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE"'
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python2.7 contrib/macdeploy/macdeployqtplus Bitcoin-Qt.app -sign -add-qt-tr $T -dmg -fancy contrib/macdeploy/fancy.plist
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python2.7 contrib/macdeploy/macdeployqtplus Bitcoin-Qt.app -add-qt-tr $T -dmg -fancy contrib/macdeploy/fancy.plist
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Build output expected:
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Bitcoin-Qt.dmg
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* Code-sign Windows -setup.exe (in a Windows virtual machine) and
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OSX Bitcoin-Qt.app (Note: only Gavin has the code-signing keys currently)
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* upload builds to SourceForge
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* create SHA256SUMS for builds, and PGP-sign it
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
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Bag Attributes
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friendlyName: Developer ID Application: BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE
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localKeyID: 6B 9C 6C A8 A5 73 70 70 E2 57 A3 49 D8 62 FB 97 C7 A5 5D 5E
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subject=/UID=PBV4GLS9J4/CN=Developer ID Application: BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE/OU=PBV4GLS9J4/O=BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE/C=US
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issuer=/CN=Developer ID Certification Authority/OU=Apple Certification Authority/O=Apple Inc./C=US
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIFhzCCBG+gAwIBAgIIJ0r1rumyfZAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAweTEtMCsGA1UE
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AwwkRGV2ZWxvcGVyIElEIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MSYwJAYDVQQL
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DB1BcHBsZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTETMBEGA1UECgwKQXBwbGUg
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SW5jLjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMwHhcNMTMwMTEwMjIzOTAxWhcNMTgwMTExMjIzOTAx
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WjCBqDEaMBgGCgmSJomT8ixkAQEMClBCVjRHTFM5SjQxQDA+BgNVBAMMN0RldmVs
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b3BlciBJRCBBcHBsaWNhdGlvbjogQklUQ09JTiBGT1VOREFUSU9OLCBJTkMuLCBU
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zf8lpNNZLfXCFjoLe9bLICKfZ7ub9V5aC8+GhckCAwEAAaOCAeEwggHdMD4GCCsG
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AQUFBwEBBDIwMDAuBggrBgEFBQcwAYYiaHR0cDovL29jc3AuYXBwbGUuY29tL29j
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c3AtZGV2aWQwMTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUa5xsqKVzcHDiV6NJ2GL7l8elXV4wDAYDVR0T
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AQH/BAIwADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRXF+2iz9x8mKEQ4Py+hy0s8uMXVDCCAQ4GA1Ud
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IASCAQUwggEBMIH+BgkqhkiG92NkBQEwgfAwKAYIKwYBBQUHAgEWHGh0dHA6Ly93
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d3cuYXBwbGUuY29tL2FwcGxlY2EwgcMGCCsGAQUFBwICMIG2DIGzUmVsaWFuY2Ug
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b24gdGhpcyBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBieSBhbnkgcGFydHkgYXNzdW1lcyBhY2NlcHRh
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bmNlIG9mIHRoZSB0aGVuIGFwcGxpY2FibGUgc3RhbmRhcmQgdGVybXMgYW5kIGNv
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bmRpdGlvbnMgb2YgdXNlLCBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBwb2xpY3kgYW5kIGNlcnRpZmlj
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YXRpb24gcHJhY3RpY2Ugc3RhdGVtZW50cy4wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBYGA1Ud
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JQEB/wQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMDMBMGCiqGSIb3Y2QGAQ0BAf8EAgUAMA0GCSqGSIb3
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DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAfJ0BjID/1dS2aEeVyhAzPzCBjG8vm0gDf+/qfwRn3+yWeL9vS
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nMdbilwM48IyQWTagjGGcojbsAd/vE4N7NhQyHInoCllNoeor1I5xx+blTaGRBK+
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dDhJbbdlGCjsLnH/BczGZi5fyEJds9lUIrp1hJidRcUKO76qb/9gc6qNZpl1vH5k
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lDUuJYt7YhAs+L6rTXDyqcK9maeQr0gaOPsRRAQLLwiQCorPeMTUNsbVMdMwZYJs
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R+PxiAnk+nyi7rfiFvPoASAYUuI6OzYL/Fa6QU4/gYyPgic944QYVkaQBnc0vEP1
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nXq6LGKwgVGcqJnkr/E2kui5gJoV5C3qll3e
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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Bag Attributes
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friendlyName: The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc.'s COMODO CA Limited ID
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localKeyID: 8C 94 64 E3 B5 B0 41 89 5B 89 B0 57 CC 74 B9 44 E5 B2 92 66
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subject=/C=US/postalCode=98104-1444/ST=WA/L=Seattle/street=Suite 300/street=71 Columbia St/O=The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc./CN=The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc.
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issuer=/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO Code Signing CA 2
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIFeDCCBGCgAwIBAgIRAJVYMd+waOER7lUqtiz3M2IwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAw
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ezELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxGzAZBgNVBAgTEkdyZWF0ZXIgTWFuY2hlc3RlcjEQMA4G
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A1UEBxMHU2FsZm9yZDEaMBgGA1UEChMRQ09NT0RPIENBIExpbWl0ZWQxITAfBgNV
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BAMTGENPTU9ETyBDb2RlIFNpZ25pbmcgQ0EgMjAeFw0xMzAxMTYwMDAwMDBaFw0x
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NDAxMTYyMzU5NTlaMIG8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UEEQwKOTgxMDQtMTQ0
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NDELMAkGA1UECAwCV0ExEDAOBgNVBAcMB1NlYXR0bGUxEjAQBgNVBAkMCVN1aXRl
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IDMwMDEXMBUGA1UECQwONzEgQ29sdW1iaWEgU3QxJTAjBgNVBAoMHFRoZSBCaXRj
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b2luIEZvdW5kYXRpb24sIEluYy4xJTAjBgNVBAMMHFRoZSBCaXRjb2luIEZvdW5k
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YXRpb24sIEluYy4wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQChUwLD
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u/hu5aFZ/n11B27awONaaDrmHm0pamiWHb01yL4JmTBtaLCrSftF8RhCscQ8jpI0
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UG1Cchmay0e3zH5o5XRs0H9C3x+SM5ozms0TWDmAYiB8aQEghsGovDk0D2nyTQeK
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cnQuY29tb2RvY2EuY29tL0NPTU9ET0NvZGVTaWduaW5nQ0EyLmNydDAkBggrBgEF
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BQcwAYYYaHR0cDovL29jc3AuY29tb2RvY2EuY29tMCgGA1UdEQQhMB+BHWxpbmRz
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D4HG5XSIIMCmYE5RgQBSEAJfI+EZERk1G9F83ZUWr0yNRZCw4O+RaM7xQhvJhEoD
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G2kpk/q2bNOc71/VyZ6SrE1JRVUON41/Flhz4M6cP0BclTicXvh+efVwqZhIz+ws
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UxF2hvC/1Xx6rqI7NYAlOYXk2MSUq3HREo+gWUPKM8em4MZZV/7XCH4QbsfxOl1J
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xS6EOQmV8hfUN4KRXI5WfGUmedBxq7dM0RSJOSQl8fq2f+JjRLfjQwQucy7LDY+y
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pRTsL2TdQV/DuDuI3s0NHRGznQNddoX5jqpXhSQFAAdgrhN1gGkWaaTPzr9IF2TG
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qgr6PEp9tIYC+MbM
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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Code-signing private key notes
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==
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The private keys for these certificates were generated on Gavin's main work machine,
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following the certificate authoritys' recommendations for generating certificate
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signing requests.
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For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine.
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The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is
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unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Qt.app bundle.
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For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine.
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The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and
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then deleted from Firefox's keystore. The exported file is used to sign the Windows setup.exe.
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Threat analysis
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--
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Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys,
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allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Qt.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid
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signature but containing a malicious binary.
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Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or
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by breaking in to his office, allowing the attacker to get the private key files and then
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install a keylogger to get the passphrase that protects them.
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Threat Mitigation
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--
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"Air gapping" the machine used to do the signing will not work, because the signing
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process needs to access a timestamp server over the network. And it would not
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prevent the "rubber hose cryptography" threat (coercing Gavin to sign a bad binary
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or divulge the private keys).
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Windows binaries are reproducibly 'gitian-built', and the setup.exe file created
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by the NSIS installer system is a 7zip archive, so you could check to make sure
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that the bitcoin-qt.exe file inside the installer had not been tampered with.
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However, an attacker could modify the installer's code, so when the setup.exe
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was run it compromised users' systems. A volunteer to write an auditing tool
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that checks the setup.exe for tampering, and checks the files in it against
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the list of gitian signatures, is needed.
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The long-term solution is something like the 'gitian downloader' system, which
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uses signatures from multiple developers to determine whether or not a binary
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should be trusted. However, that just pushes the problem to "how will
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non-technical users securely get the gitian downloader code to start?"
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