dogecoin/contrib/verify-commits
Wladimir J. van der Laan ccf5e43ce0
Merge #9920: [0.14] Allow any subkey in verify-commits (BlueMatt)
589cd63 Allow any subkey in verify-commits (Matt Corallo)

Tree-SHA512: e3175273c648ed2d990ac931efae5e4bf3bd5ddce7b591f5e64a6831f3c029b252bc5d241dd8d3874467747c3ded87aa1fa334ff53d940cde32c22e584a2c4d0
2017-03-05 14:33:59 +01:00
..
allow-revsig-commits Add Pieter's old signed commits to revsig-commits 2017-02-28 16:45:01 +01:00
gpg.sh Allow any subkey in verify-commits 2017-03-05 02:07:23 +01:00
pre-push-hook.sh [copyright] add MIT license headers to .sh scripts where missing 2016-09-11 13:36:22 -06:00
README.md Add README for verify-commits 2016-06-09 13:58:29 -04:00
trusted-git-root Remove keys that are no longer used for merging 2016-05-21 11:29:01 +02:00
trusted-keys Allow any subkey in verify-commits 2017-03-05 02:07:23 +01:00
verify-commits.sh Require merge commits merge branches on top of other merge commits 2017-02-01 18:22:27 -05:00

Tooling for verification of PGP signed commits

This is an incomplete work in progress, but currently includes a pre-push hook script (pre-push-hook.sh) for maintainers to ensure that their own commits are PGP signed (nearly always merge commits), as well as a script to verify commits against a trusted keys list.

Using verify-commits.sh safely

Remember that you can't use an untrusted script to verify itself. This means that checking out code, then running verify-commits.sh against HEAD is not safe, because the version of verify-commits.sh that you just ran could be backdoored. Instead, you need to use a trusted version of verify-commits prior to checkout to make sure you're checking out only code signed by trusted keys:

git fetch origin && \
  ./contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.sh origin/master && \
  git checkout origin/master

Note that the above isn't a good UI/UX yet, and needs significant improvements to make it more convenient and reduce the chance of errors; pull-reqs improving this process would be much appreciated.