dogecoin/src/makefile.unix

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# Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
# Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
# file license.txt or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
USE_UPNP:=0
DEFS=-DNOPCH
DEFS += $(addprefix -I,$(BOOST_INCLUDE_PATH) $(BDB_INCLUDE_PATH) $(OPENSSL_INCLUDE_PATH))
LIBS += $(addprefix -l,$(BOOST_LIB_PATH) $(BDB_LIB_PATH) $(OPENSSL_LIB_PATH))
LMODE = dynamic
LMODE2 = dynamic
ifdef STATIC
LMODE = static
ifeq (${STATIC}, all)
LMODE2 = static
endif
endif
# for boost 1.37, add -mt to the boost libraries
LIBS= \
-Wl,-B$(LMODE) \
-l boost_system$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
-l boost_filesystem$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
-l boost_program_options$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
-l boost_thread$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
-l db_cxx$(BDB_LIB_SUFFIX) \
-l ssl \
-l crypto
ifndef USE_UPNP
override USE_UPNP = -
endif
ifneq (${USE_UPNP}, -)
LIBS += -l miniupnpc
DEFS += -DUSE_UPNP=$(USE_UPNP)
endif
ifneq (${USE_SSL}, 0)
DEFS += -DUSE_SSL
endif
LIBS+= \
-Wl,-B$(LMODE2) \
-l z \
-l dl \
-l pthread
# Hardening
# Make some classes of vulnerabilities unexploitable in case one is discovered.
#
# This is a workaround for Ubuntu bug #691722, the default -fstack-protector causes
# -fstack-protector-all to be ignored unless -fno-stack-protector is used first.
# see: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/gcc-4.5/+bug/691722
HARDENING=-fno-stack-protector
# Stack Canaries
# Put numbers at the beginning of each stack frame and check that they are the same.
# If a stack buffer if overflowed, it writes over the canary number and then on return
# when that number is checked, it won't be the same and the program will exit with
# a "Stack smashing detected" error instead of being exploited.
HARDENING+=-fstack-protector-all -Wstack-protector
# Make some important things such as the global offset table read only as soon as
# the dynamic linker is finished building it. This will prevent overwriting of addresses
# which would later be jumped to.
HARDENING+=-Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now
# Build position independent code to take advantage of Address Space Layout Randomization
# offered by some kernels.
# see doc/build-unix.txt for more information.
ifdef PIE
HARDENING+=-fPIE -pie
endif
# -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 does some checking for potentially exploitable code patterns in
# the source such overflowing a statically defined buffer.
HARDENING+=-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
#
DEBUGFLAGS=-g
CXXFLAGS=-O2
xCXXFLAGS=-pthread -Wno-invalid-offsetof -Wformat $(DEBUGFLAGS) $(DEFS) $(HARDENING) $(CXXFLAGS)
HEADERS = \
base58.h \
bignum.h \
crypter.h \
db.h \
headers.h \
init.h \
irc.h \
key.h \
keystore.h \
main.h \
net.h \
noui.h \
protocol.h \
bitcoinrpc.h \
script.h \
serialize.h \
strlcpy.h \
uint256.h \
util.h \
wallet.h
OBJS= \
obj/crypter.o \
obj/db.o \
obj/init.o \
obj/irc.o \
obj/keystore.o \
obj/main.o \
obj/net.o \
obj/protocol.o \
obj/bitcoinrpc.o \
obj/script.o \
obj/util.o \
obj/wallet.o
all: bitcoind
# auto-generated dependencies:
-include obj/nogui/*.P
-include obj/test/*.P
obj/nogui/%.o: %.cpp
$(CXX) -c $(xCXXFLAGS) -MMD -o $@ $<
@cp $(@:%.o=%.d) $(@:%.o=%.P); \
sed -e 's/#.*//' -e 's/^[^:]*: *//' -e 's/ *\\$$//' \
-e '/^$$/ d' -e 's/$$/ :/' < $(@:%.o=%.d) >> $(@:%.o=%.P); \
rm -f $(@:%.o=%.d)
bitcoind: $(OBJS:obj/%=obj/nogui/%)
$(CXX) $(xCXXFLAGS) -o $@ $^ $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
obj/test/%.o: test/%.cpp
$(CXX) -c $(xCXXFLAGS) -MMD -o $@ $<
@cp $(@:%.o=%.d) $(@:%.o=%.P); \
sed -e 's/#.*//' -e 's/^[^:]*: *//' -e 's/ *\\$$//' \
-e '/^$$/ d' -e 's/$$/ :/' < $(@:%.o=%.d) >> $(@:%.o=%.P); \
rm -f $(@:%.o=%.d)
test_bitcoin: obj/test/test_bitcoin.o $(filter-out obj/nogui/init.o,$(OBJS:obj/%=obj/nogui/%))
$(CXX) $(xCXXFLAGS) -o $@ $(LIBPATHS) $^ -Wl,-Bstatic -lboost_unit_test_framework $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
clean:
-rm -f bitcoind test_bitcoin
-rm -f obj/*.o
-rm -f obj/nogui/*.o
-rm -f obj/test/*.o
-rm -f obj/*.P
-rm -f obj/nogui/*.P
-rm -f obj/test/*.P