s3v4: read and verify S3 signature v4 chunks separately

This commit fixes a security issue in the signature v4 chunked
reader. Before, the reader returned unverified data to the caller
and would only verify the chunk signature once it has encountered
the end of the chunk payload.

Now, the chunk reader reads the entire chunk into an in-memory buffer,
verifies the signature and then returns data to the caller.

In general, this is a common security problem. We verifying data
streams, the verifier MUST NOT return data to the upper layers / its
callers as long as it has not verified the current data chunk / data
segment:
```
func (r *Reader) Read(buffer []byte) {
   if err := r.readNext(r.internalBuffer); err != nil {
      return err
   }
   if err := r.verify(r.internalBuffer); err != nil {
      return err
   }
   copy(buffer, r.internalBuffer)
}
```
This commit is contained in:
Andreas Auernhammer 2021-03-16 18:55:48 +01:00 committed by Harshavardhana
parent d04201e2a6
commit 472d78604b

View file

@ -166,74 +166,25 @@ func newSignV4ChunkedReader(req *http.Request) (io.ReadCloser, APIErrorCode) {
seedDate: seedDate,
region: region,
chunkSHA256Writer: sha256.New(),
state: readChunkHeader,
buffer: make([]byte, 64*1024),
}, ErrNone
}
// Represents the overall state that is required for decoding a
// AWS Signature V4 chunked reader.
type s3ChunkedReader struct {
reader *bufio.Reader
cred auth.Credentials
seedSignature string
seedDate time.Time
region string
state chunkState
lastChunk bool
chunkSignature string
reader *bufio.Reader
cred auth.Credentials
seedSignature string
seedDate time.Time
region string
chunkSHA256Writer hash.Hash // Calculates sha256 of chunk data.
n uint64 // Unread bytes in chunk
buffer []byte
offset int
err error
}
// Read chunk reads the chunk token signature portion.
func (cr *s3ChunkedReader) readS3ChunkHeader() {
// Read the first chunk line until CRLF.
var hexChunkSize, hexChunkSignature []byte
hexChunkSize, hexChunkSignature, cr.err = readChunkLine(cr.reader)
if cr.err != nil {
return
}
// <hex>;token=value - converts the hex into its uint64 form.
cr.n, cr.err = parseHexUint(hexChunkSize)
if cr.err != nil {
return
}
if cr.n == 0 {
cr.err = io.EOF
}
// Save the incoming chunk signature.
cr.chunkSignature = string(hexChunkSignature)
}
type chunkState int
const (
readChunkHeader chunkState = iota
readChunkTrailer
readChunk
verifyChunk
eofChunk
)
func (cs chunkState) String() string {
stateString := ""
switch cs {
case readChunkHeader:
stateString = "readChunkHeader"
case readChunkTrailer:
stateString = "readChunkTrailer"
case readChunk:
stateString = "readChunk"
case verifyChunk:
stateString = "verifyChunk"
case eofChunk:
stateString = "eofChunk"
}
return stateString
}
func (cr *s3ChunkedReader) Close() (err error) {
return nil
}
@ -241,83 +192,165 @@ func (cr *s3ChunkedReader) Close() (err error) {
// Read - implements `io.Reader`, which transparently decodes
// the incoming AWS Signature V4 streaming signature.
func (cr *s3ChunkedReader) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
// First, if there is any unread data, copy it to the client
// provided buffer.
if cr.offset > 0 {
n = copy(buf, cr.buffer[cr.offset:])
if n == len(buf) {
cr.offset += n
return n, nil
}
cr.offset = 0
buf = buf[n:]
}
// Now, we read one chunk from the underlying reader.
// A chunk has the following format:
// <chunk-size-as-hex> + ";chunk-signature=" + <signature-as-hex> + "\r\n" + <payload> + "\r\n"
//
// Frist, we read the chunk size but fail if it is larger
// than 1 MB. We must not accept arbitrary large chunks.
// One 1 MB is a reasonable max limit.
//
// Then we read the signature and payload data. We compute the SHA256 checksum
// of the payload and verify that it matches the expected signature value.
//
// The last chunk is *always* 0-sized. So, we must only return io.EOF if we have encountered
// a chunk with a chunk size = 0. However, this chunk still has a signature and we must
// verify it.
const MaxSize = 1 << 20 // 1 MB
var size int
for {
switch cr.state {
case readChunkHeader:
cr.readS3ChunkHeader()
// If we're at the end of a chunk.
if cr.n == 0 && cr.err == io.EOF {
cr.state = readChunkTrailer
cr.lastChunk = true
continue
}
if cr.err != nil {
return 0, cr.err
}
cr.state = readChunk
case readChunkTrailer:
cr.err = readCRLF(cr.reader)
if cr.err != nil {
return 0, errMalformedEncoding
}
cr.state = verifyChunk
case readChunk:
// There is no more space left in the request buffer.
if len(buf) == 0 {
return n, nil
}
rbuf := buf
// The request buffer is larger than the current chunk size.
// Read only the current chunk from the underlying reader.
if uint64(len(rbuf)) > cr.n {
rbuf = rbuf[:cr.n]
}
var n0 int
n0, cr.err = cr.reader.Read(rbuf)
if cr.err != nil {
// We have lesser than chunk size advertised in chunkHeader, this is 'unexpected'.
if cr.err == io.EOF {
cr.err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
return 0, cr.err
}
b, err := cr.reader.ReadByte()
if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if err != nil {
cr.err = err
return n, cr.err
}
if b == ';' { // separating character
break
}
// Calculate sha256.
cr.chunkSHA256Writer.Write(rbuf[:n0])
// Update the bytes read into request buffer so far.
n += n0
buf = buf[n0:]
// Update bytes to be read of the current chunk before verifying chunk's signature.
cr.n -= uint64(n0)
// If we're at the end of a chunk.
if cr.n == 0 {
cr.state = readChunkTrailer
continue
}
case verifyChunk:
// Calculate the hashed chunk.
hashedChunk := hex.EncodeToString(cr.chunkSHA256Writer.Sum(nil))
// Calculate the chunk signature.
newSignature := getChunkSignature(cr.cred, cr.seedSignature, cr.region, cr.seedDate, hashedChunk)
if !compareSignatureV4(cr.chunkSignature, newSignature) {
// Chunk signature doesn't match we return signature does not match.
cr.err = errSignatureMismatch
return 0, cr.err
}
// Newly calculated signature becomes the seed for the next chunk
// this follows the chaining.
cr.seedSignature = newSignature
cr.chunkSHA256Writer.Reset()
if cr.lastChunk {
cr.state = eofChunk
} else {
cr.state = readChunkHeader
}
case eofChunk:
return n, io.EOF
// Manually deserialize the size since AWS specified
// the chunk size to be of variable width. In particular,
// a size of 16 is encoded as `10` while a size of 64 KB
// is `10000`.
switch {
case b >= '0' && b <= '9':
size = size<<4 | int(b-'0')
case b >= 'a' && b <= 'f':
size = size<<4 | int(b-('a'-10))
case b >= 'A' && b <= 'F':
size = size<<4 | int(b-('A'-10))
default:
cr.err = errMalformedEncoding
return n, cr.err
}
if size > MaxSize {
cr.err = errMalformedEncoding
return n, cr.err
}
}
// Now, we read the signature of the following payload and expect:
// chunk-signature=" + <signature-as-hex> + "\r\n"
//
// The signature is 64 bytes long (hex-encoded SHA256 hash) and
// starts with a 16 byte header: len("chunk-signature=") + 64 == 80.
var signature [80]byte
_, err = io.ReadFull(cr.reader, signature[:])
if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if err != nil {
cr.err = err
return n, cr.err
}
if !bytes.HasPrefix(signature[:], []byte("chunk-signature=")) {
cr.err = errMalformedEncoding
return n, cr.err
}
b, err := cr.reader.ReadByte()
if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if err != nil {
cr.err = err
return n, cr.err
}
if b != '\r' {
cr.err = errMalformedEncoding
return n, cr.err
}
b, err = cr.reader.ReadByte()
if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if err != nil {
cr.err = err
return n, cr.err
}
if b != '\n' {
cr.err = errMalformedEncoding
return n, cr.err
}
if cap(cr.buffer) < size {
cr.buffer = make([]byte, size)
} else {
cr.buffer = cr.buffer[:size]
}
// Now, we read the payload and compute its SHA-256 hash.
_, err = io.ReadFull(cr.reader, cr.buffer)
if err == io.EOF && size != 0 {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if err != nil && err != io.EOF {
cr.err = err
return n, cr.err
}
b, err = cr.reader.ReadByte()
if b != '\r' {
cr.err = errMalformedEncoding
return n, cr.err
}
b, err = cr.reader.ReadByte()
if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if err != nil {
cr.err = err
return n, cr.err
}
if b != '\n' {
cr.err = errMalformedEncoding
return n, cr.err
}
// Once we have read the entire chunk successfully, we verify
// that the received signature matches our computed signature.
cr.chunkSHA256Writer.Write(cr.buffer)
newSignature := getChunkSignature(cr.cred, cr.seedSignature, cr.region, cr.seedDate, hex.EncodeToString(cr.chunkSHA256Writer.Sum(nil)))
if !compareSignatureV4(string(signature[16:]), newSignature) {
cr.err = errSignatureMismatch
return n, cr.err
}
cr.seedSignature = newSignature
cr.chunkSHA256Writer.Reset()
// If the chunk size is zero we return io.EOF. As specified by AWS,
// only the last chunk is zero-sized.
if size == 0 {
cr.err = io.EOF
return n, cr.err
}
cr.offset = copy(buf, cr.buffer)
n += cr.offset
return n, err
}
// readCRLF - check if reader only has '\r\n' CRLF character.