Because of our Proxy types, every output will return something when
you call `.isSecret` on it. However, if you call it on an output from
a version of `@pulumi/pulumi` which did not support secrets, the thing
you will get back is not undefined but rather an `Output` which wraps
undefined.
Because of this, care must be taken when reading this property and so
a small helper is introduced and used in places we care about.
This is helpful some round trip cases where we many not be able to
build the encrypter or decrypter but we will end up not needing
them. When we fail to load the manager, we return a manager that has
the correct state, but will error when it tries to preform any
operations. However, if there are no secrets in the deployment, these
methods will never be called and we'll be able to correctly roundtrip
checkpoints even without having access to the password (since there
were no secret values to decrypt or encrypt).
We were dropping new and old states on the floor instead of including
them as part of the previewed operation due to a logic error (we want
to append them when there are no errors from serialization, vs when
there are errors).
When creating a new stack using the local backend, the default
checkpoint has no deployment. That means there's a nil snapshot
created, which means our strategy of using the base snapshot's secrets
manager was not going to work. Trying to do so would result in a panic
because the baseSnapshot is nil in this case.
Using the secrets manager we are going to use to persist the snapshot
is a better idea anyhow, as that's what's actually going to be burned
into the deployment when we serialize the snapshot, so let's use that
instead.
This test ensures that our secrets support works by deploying
resources with a mix of secret and plantext inputs and then checks the
deployment file to ensure that everything is marked as a secret.
All existing implementations would fail if secret values were passed
to the dyanmic provider. When the provider says it does not support
secrets, the engine will do basic secrets tracking (any outputs with
the same names as secret inputs become secrets themselves).
Since we don't support nesting secrets (as they are modeled as
Outputs), as we deserialize, we push the secretness up to top level,
where we will correctly use it to mark the output as secret.
This fixes an issue where if you created a StackReference resource,
with a mix of secret and non secret properties, you would see the
"wire form" of the secrets as values on the `outputs` map of the
StackReference resource.
In our system, we model secrets as outputs with an additional bit of
metadata that says they are secret. For Read and Register resource
calls, our RPC interface says if the client side of the interface can
handle secrets being returned (i.e. the language SDK knows how to
sniff for the special signiture and resolve the output with the
special bit set).
For Invoke, we have no such model. Instead, we return a `Promise<T>`
where T's shape has just regular property fields. There's no place
for us to tack the secretness onto, since there are no Outputs.
So, for now, don't even return secret values back across the invoke
channel. We can still take them as arguments (which is good) but we
can't even return secrets as part of invoke calls. This is not ideal,
but given the way we model these sources, there's no way around
this. Fortunately, the result of these invoke calls are not stored in
the checkpoint and since the type is not Output<T> it will be clear
that the underlying value is just present in plaintext. A user that
wants to pass the result of an invoke into a resource can turn an
existing property into a secret via `pulumi.secret`.
This change allows using the passphrase secrets manager when creating
a stack managed by the Pulumi service. `pulumi stack init`, `pulumi
new` and `pulumi up` all learned a new optional argument
`--secrets-provider` which can be set to "passphrase" to force the
passphrase based secrets provider to be used. When unset the default
secrets provider is used based on the backend (for local stacks this
is passphrase, for remote stacks, it is the key managed by the pulumi
service).
As part of this change, we also initialize the secrets manager when a
stack is created, instead of waiting for the first time a secret
config value is stored. We do this so that if an update is run using
`pulumi.secret` before any secret configuration values are used, we
already have the correct encryption method selected for a stack.
When using `pulumi stack` or `pulumi stack output`, we were showing
secret values in the worst way possible. They were displayed in our
object structure with a signature key that denoted they were secrets
but they were not encrypted, so you still saw the underlying value.
To be able to continue to leverage the mechanisms we have for
serializing property maps, we add a rewriting step where we make a
pass over the property map before we serialize it. For any secret
values we find, if `--show-secrets` was passed, we simply replace the
secret value with the underlying element it wraps (this ensures that
we don't serialize it as a rich object with the signature key). If
`--show-secrets` was not passed, we simply replace it with a new
string property with the value `[secret]`.
This mimics the behavor we see from the stack outputs we see when you
complete a `pulumi update`
We have now done all the work needed such that we can start passing
the passphrase and service secrets managers into the engine to be used
when storing values.
With this change `pulumi up` will now correctly encrypt secrets
instead of just base64 encoding them.
We move the implementations of our secrets managers in to
`pkg/secrets` (which is where the base64 one lives) and wire their use
up during deserialization.
It's a little unfortunate that for the passphrase based secrets
manager, we have to require `PULUMI_CONFIG_PASSPHRASE` when
constructing it from state, but we can make more progress with the
changes as they are now, and I think we can come up with some ways to
mitigate this problem a bit (at least make it only a problem for cases
where you are trying to take a stack reference to another stack that
is managed with local encryption).
Logs are no longer provided by the service (this is a holdover from
the PPC days where service deployments where done in the cloud and it
handled collecting logs).
Removing this breaks another cycle that would be introduced with the
next change (in our test code)
The next change is going to do some code motion that would create some
circular imports if we did not do this. There was nothing that
required the members we were moving be in the backend package, so it
was easy enough to pull them out.
When preforming an update, require that a secrets manager is passed in
as part of the `backend.UpdateOperation` bag and use it. The CLI now
passes this in (it still uses the default base64 secrets manager, so
this is just code motion into a high layer, since the CLI will be the
one to choose what secrets manager to use based on project settings).
There are a few operations we do (stack rename, importing and edits)
where we will materialize a `deploy.Snapshot` from an existing
deployment, mutate it in somewhay, and then store it.
In these cases, we will just re-use the secrets manager that was used
to build the snapshot when we re-serialize it. This is less than ideal
in some cases, because many of these operations could run on an
"encrypted" copy of the Snapshot, where Inputs and Outputs have not
been decrypted.
Unfortunately, our system now is not set up in a great way to support
this and adding something like a `deploy.EncryptedSnapshot` would
require large scale code duplications.
So, for now, we'll take the hit of decrypting and re-encrypting, but
long term introducing a `deploy.EncryptedSnapshot` may be nice as it
would let us elide the encryption/decryption steps in some places and
would also make it clear what parts of our system have access to the
plaintext values of secrets.
We have many cases where we want to do the following:
deployment -> snapshot -> process snapshot -> deployment
We now retain information in the snapshot about the secrets manager
that was used to construct it, so in these round trip cases, we can
re-use the existing manager.
For a given {Read,Register}Resource call, there may be a set of
outputs that should be treated as secrets, even if the provider itself
does not think they are always sensitive. For example, when
constructing a `@pulumi/random::RandomString` it's possible that you
will be using the string as a shared secret between two
resources (e.g. the resigstration of a webhook and its handler) and so
you want the value stored in the checkpoint in a secure manner.
This change augments the RPCs such that we can communicate this from
the language host into the engine.
When nil, it means no information is retained in the deployment about
the manager (as there is none) and any attempt to persist secret
values fails.
This should only be used in cases where the snapshot is known to not
contain secret values.
Half of the call sites didn't care about these values and with the
secrets work the ergonmics of calling this method when it has to
return serialized ouputs isn't great. Move the serialization for this
into the CLI itself, as it was the only place that cared to do
this (so it could display things to end users).
The previous changes to remove config loading out of the backend means
that the backends no longer need to track this information, as they
never use it.
As part of the pluggable secrets work, the crypter's used for secrets
are no longer tied to a backend. To enforce this, we remove the
`backend.GetStackCrypter` function and then have the relevent logic to
construct one live inside the CLI itself.
Right now the CLI still uses the backend type to decide what Crypter
to build, but we'll change that shortly.
We require configuration to preform updates (as well as previews,
destroys and refreshes). Because of how everything evolved, loading
this configuration (and finding the coresponding decrypter) was
implemented in both the file and http backends, which wasn't great.
Refactor things such that the CLI itself builds out this information
and passes it along to the backend to preform operations. This means
less code duplicated between backends and less places the backend
assume things about the existence of `Pulumi.yaml` files and in
general makes the interface more plesent to use for others uses.
For cloud backed stacks, this was already returning nil and due to the
fact that we no longer include config in the checkpoint for local
stacks, it was nil there as well.
Removing this helps clean stuff up and is should make some future
refactorings around custom secret managers easier to land.
We can always add it back later if we miss it (and make it actually do
the right thing!)
When constructing a Deployment (which is a plaintext representation of
a Snapshot), ensure that we encrypt secret values. To do so, we
introduce a new type `secrets.Manager` which is able to encrypt and
decrypt values. In addition, it is able to reflect information about
itself that can be stored in the deployment such that we can
deserialize the deployment into a snapshot (decrypting the values in
the process) without external knowledge about how it was encrypted.
The ability to do this is import for allowing stack references to
work, since two stacks may not use the same manager (or they will use
the same type of manager, but have different state).
The state value is stored in plaintext in the deployment, so it **must
not** contain sensitive data.
A sample manager, which just base64 encodes and decodes strings is
provided, as it useful for testing. We will allow it to be varried
soon.
When a provider does not natively understand secrets, we need to pass
inputs as raw values, as to not confuse it.
This leads to a not great experience by default, where we pass raw
values to `Check` and then use the results as the inputs to remaining
operations. This means that by default, we don't end up retaining
information about secrets in the checkpoint, since the call to `Check`
erases all of our information about secrets.
To provide a nicer experience we were don't lose information about
secrets even in cases where providers don't natively understand them,
we take property maps produced by the provider and mark any values in
them that are not listed as secret as secret if the coresponding input
was a secret.
This ensures that any secret property values in the inputs are
reflected back into the outputs, even for providers that don't
understand secrets natively.
When serializing values, if the other end of the resource monitor
interface does not support secrets (e.g. it is an older CLI), don't
pass secrets to it.
`Output<T>` now tracks if an output represents secret data or
not. When secret, it is marshalled as a secret value and we signal to
the resource monitor that it is safe to return secret values to us.
The `pulumi` module exports a new functiion, `secret<T>` which works
in the same was a `output<T>` except that it marks the underlying
output as a secret.
This secret bit flows as you would expect across `all`'s and
`apply`'s.
Note that in process memory, the raw value is still present, when you
run an `apply` for a secret output, you are able to see the raw
value. In addition, if you capture a secret output with a lambda, the
raw value will be present in the captured source text.
A new `Secret` property value is introduced, and plumbed across the
engine.
- When Unmarshalling properties /from/ RPC calls, we instruct the
marshaller to retain secrets, since we now understand them in the
rest of the engine.
- When Marshalling properties /to/ RPC calls, we use or tracked data
to understand if the other side of the connection can accept
secrets. If they can, we marshall them in a similar manner to assets
where we have a special object with a signiture specific for secrets
and an underlying value (which is the /plaintext/ value). In cases
where the other end of the connection does not understand secrets,
we just drop the metadata and marshal the underlying value as we
normally would.
- Any secrets that are passed across the engine events boundary are
presently passed as just `[secret]`.
- When persisting secret values as part of a deployment, we use a rich
object so that we can track the value is a secret, but right now the
underlying value is not actually encrypted.