Merge branch 'develop' of github.com:matrix-org/synapse into matrix-org-hotfixes

INSTALL.md

@@ -124,12 +124,21 @@ sudo pacman -S base-devel python python-pip \
 
 #### CentOS/Fedora
 
-Installing prerequisites on CentOS 7 or Fedora 25:
+Installing prerequisites on CentOS 8 or Fedora>26:
+
+```
+sudo dnf install libtiff-devel libjpeg-devel libzip-devel freetype-devel \
+                 libwebp-devel tk-devel redhat-rpm-config \
+                 python3-virtualenv libffi-devel openssl-devel
+sudo dnf groupinstall "Development Tools"
+```
+
+Installing prerequisites on CentOS 7 or Fedora<=25:
 
 ```
 sudo yum install libtiff-devel libjpeg-devel libzip-devel freetype-devel \
                  lcms2-devel libwebp-devel tcl-devel tk-devel redhat-rpm-config \
-                 python-virtualenv libffi-devel openssl-devel
+                 python3-virtualenv libffi-devel openssl-devel
 sudo yum groupinstall "Development Tools"
 ```
 

changelog.d/6925.doc

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Updated CentOS8 install instructions. Contributed by Richard Kellner.

changelog.d/7026.removal

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Remove the unused query_auth federation endpoint per MSC2451.

changelog.d/7034.removal

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Remove special handling of aliases events from [MSC2260](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2260) added in v1.10.0rc1.

changelog.d/7044.bugfix

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix a bug that renders UTF-8 text files incorrectly when loaded from media. Contributed by @TheStranjer.

changelog.d/7058.feature

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Render a configurable and comprehensible error page if something goes wrong during the SAML2 authentication process.

changelog.d/7063.misc

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Add type annotations and comments to the auth handler.

changelog.d/7066.bugfix

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix a bug that would cause Synapse to respond with an error about event visibility if a client tried to request the state of a room at a given token.

changelog.d/7067.feature

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Render a configurable and comprehensible error page if something goes wrong during the SAML2 authentication process.

changelog.d/7070.bugfix

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Repair a data-corruption issue which was introduced in Synapse 1.10, and fixed in Synapse 1.11, and which could cause `/sync` to return with 404 errors about missing events and unknown rooms.

changelog.d/7074.bugfix

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix a bug causing account validity renewal emails to be sent even if the feature is turned off in some cases.

changelog.d/7085.feature

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Add an optional parameter to control whether other sessions are logged out when a user's password is modified.

changelog.d/7094.misc

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Improve performance when making HTTPS requests to sygnal, sydent, etc, by sharing the SSL context object between connections.

changelog.d/7095.misc

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Attempt to improve performance of state res v2 algorithm.

docs/admin_api/user_admin_api.rst

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ The parameter ``threepids`` is optional.
 The parameter ``avatar_url`` is optional.
 The parameter ``admin`` is optional and defaults to 'false'.
 The parameter ``deactivated`` is optional and defaults to 'false'.
+The parameter ``password`` is optional. If provided the user's password is updated and all devices are logged out.
 If the user already exists then optional parameters default to the current value.
 
 List Accounts
@@ -168,11 +169,14 @@ with a body of:
 .. code:: json
 
    {
-       "new_password": "<secret>"
+       "new_password": "<secret>",
+       "logout_devices": true,
    }
 
 including an ``access_token`` of a server admin.
 
+The parameter ``new_password`` is required.
+The parameter ``logout_devices`` is optional and defaults to ``true``.
 
 Get whether a user is a server administrator or not
 ===================================================

docs/sample_config.yaml

@@ -1347,6 +1347,25 @@ saml2_config:
   #
   #grandfathered_mxid_source_attribute: upn
 
+  # Directory in which Synapse will try to find the template files below.
+  # If not set, default templates from within the Synapse package will be used.
+  #
+  # DO NOT UNCOMMENT THIS SETTING unless you want to customise the templates.
+  # If you *do* uncomment it, you will need to make sure that all the templates
+  # below are in the directory.
+  #
+  # Synapse will look for the following templates in this directory:
+  #
+  # * HTML page to display to users if something goes wrong during the
+  #   authentication process: 'saml_error.html'.
+  #
+  #   This template doesn't currently need any variable to render.
+  #
+  # You can see the default templates at:
+  # https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/tree/master/synapse/res/templates
+  #
+  #template_dir: "res/templates"
+
 
 
 # Enable CAS for registration and login.

synapse/config/saml2_config.py

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
 # limitations under the License.
 
 import logging
+import os
+
+import pkg_resources
 
 from synapse.python_dependencies import DependencyException, check_requirements
 from synapse.util.module_loader import load_module, load_python_module
@@ -160,6 +163,14 @@ class SAML2Config(Config):
             saml2_config.get("saml_session_lifetime", "5m")
         )
 
+        template_dir = saml2_config.get("template_dir")
+        if not template_dir:
+            template_dir = pkg_resources.resource_filename("synapse", "res/templates",)
+
+        self.saml2_error_html_content = self.read_file(
+            os.path.join(template_dir, "saml_error.html"), "saml2_config.saml_error",
+        )
+
     def _default_saml_config_dict(
         self, required_attributes: set, optional_attributes: set
     ):
@@ -325,6 +336,25 @@ class SAML2Config(Config):
           # The default is 'uid'.
           #
           #grandfathered_mxid_source_attribute: upn
+
+          # Directory in which Synapse will try to find the template files below.
+          # If not set, default templates from within the Synapse package will be used.
+          #
+          # DO NOT UNCOMMENT THIS SETTING unless you want to customise the templates.
+          # If you *do* uncomment it, you will need to make sure that all the templates
+          # below are in the directory.
+          #
+          # Synapse will look for the following templates in this directory:
+          #
+          # * HTML page to display to users if something goes wrong during the
+          #   authentication process: 'saml_error.html'.
+          #
+          #   This template doesn't currently need any variable to render.
+          #
+          # You can see the default templates at:
+          # https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/tree/master/synapse/res/templates
+          #
+          #template_dir: "res/templates"
         """ % {
             "config_dir_path": config_dir_path
         }

synapse/crypto/context_factory.py

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ class ServerContextFactory(ContextFactory):
 
 
 @implementer(IPolicyForHTTPS)
-class ClientTLSOptionsFactory(object):
+class FederationPolicyForHTTPS(object):
     """Factory for Twisted SSLClientConnectionCreators that are used to make connections
     to remote servers for federation.
 
@@ -103,15 +103,15 @@ class ClientTLSOptionsFactory(object):
         # let us do).
         minTLS = _TLS_VERSION_MAP[config.federation_client_minimum_tls_version]
 
-        self._verify_ssl = CertificateOptions(
+        _verify_ssl = CertificateOptions(
             trustRoot=trust_root, insecurelyLowerMinimumTo=minTLS
         )
-        self._verify_ssl_context = self._verify_ssl.getContext()
+        self._verify_ssl_context = _verify_ssl.getContext()
-        self._verify_ssl_context.set_info_callback(self._context_info_cb)
+        self._verify_ssl_context.set_info_callback(_context_info_cb)
 
-        self._no_verify_ssl = CertificateOptions(insecurelyLowerMinimumTo=minTLS)
+        _no_verify_ssl = CertificateOptions(insecurelyLowerMinimumTo=minTLS)
-        self._no_verify_ssl_context = self._no_verify_ssl.getContext()
+        self._no_verify_ssl_context = _no_verify_ssl.getContext()
-        self._no_verify_ssl_context.set_info_callback(self._context_info_cb)
+        self._no_verify_ssl_context.set_info_callback(_context_info_cb)
 
     def get_options(self, host: bytes):
 
@@ -136,23 +136,6 @@ class ClientTLSOptionsFactory(object):
 
         return SSLClientConnectionCreator(host, ssl_context, should_verify)
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _context_info_cb(ssl_connection, where, ret):
-        """The 'information callback' for our openssl context object."""
-        # we assume that the app_data on the connection object has been set to
-        # a TLSMemoryBIOProtocol object. (This is done by SSLClientConnectionCreator)
-        tls_protocol = ssl_connection.get_app_data()
-        try:
-            # ... we further assume that SSLClientConnectionCreator has set the
-            # '_synapse_tls_verifier' attribute to a ConnectionVerifier object.
-            tls_protocol._synapse_tls_verifier.verify_context_info_cb(
-                ssl_connection, where
-            )
-        except:  # noqa: E722, taken from the twisted implementation
-            logger.exception("Error during info_callback")
-            f = Failure()
-            tls_protocol.failVerification(f)
-
     def creatorForNetloc(self, hostname, port):
         """Implements the IPolicyForHTTPS interace so that this can be passed
         directly to agents.
@@ -160,6 +143,43 @@ class ClientTLSOptionsFactory(object):
         return self.get_options(hostname)
 
 
+@implementer(IPolicyForHTTPS)
+class RegularPolicyForHTTPS(object):
+    """Factory for Twisted SSLClientConnectionCreators that are used to make connections
+    to remote servers, for other than federation.
+
+    Always uses the same OpenSSL context object, which uses the default OpenSSL CA
+    trust root.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        trust_root = platformTrust()
+        self._ssl_context = CertificateOptions(trustRoot=trust_root).getContext()
+        self._ssl_context.set_info_callback(_context_info_cb)
+
+    def creatorForNetloc(self, hostname, port):
+        return SSLClientConnectionCreator(hostname, self._ssl_context, True)
+
+
+def _context_info_cb(ssl_connection, where, ret):
+    """The 'information callback' for our openssl context objects.
+
+    Note: Once this is set as the info callback on a Context object, the Context should
+    only be used with the SSLClientConnectionCreator.
+    """
+    # we assume that the app_data on the connection object has been set to
+    # a TLSMemoryBIOProtocol object. (This is done by SSLClientConnectionCreator)
+    tls_protocol = ssl_connection.get_app_data()
+    try:
+        # ... we further assume that SSLClientConnectionCreator has set the
+        # '_synapse_tls_verifier' attribute to a ConnectionVerifier object.
+        tls_protocol._synapse_tls_verifier.verify_context_info_cb(ssl_connection, where)
+    except:  # noqa: E722, taken from the twisted implementation
+        logger.exception("Error during info_callback")
+        f = Failure()
+        tls_protocol.failVerification(f)
+
+
 @implementer(IOpenSSLClientConnectionCreator)
 class SSLClientConnectionCreator(object):
     """Creates openssl connection objects for client connections.

synapse/federation/federation_base.py

@@ -39,10 +39,8 @@ from synapse.logging.context import (
     LoggingContext,
     PreserveLoggingContext,
     make_deferred_yieldable,
-    preserve_fn,
 )
 from synapse.types import JsonDict, get_domain_from_id
-from synapse.util import unwrapFirstError
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -57,86 +55,6 @@ class FederationBase(object):
         self.store = hs.get_datastore()
         self._clock = hs.get_clock()
 
-    @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def _check_sigs_and_hash_and_fetch(
-        self,
-        origin: str,
-        pdus: List[EventBase],
-        room_version: str,
-        outlier: bool = False,
-        include_none: bool = False,
-    ):
-        """Takes a list of PDUs and checks the signatures and hashs of each
-        one. If a PDU fails its signature check then we check if we have it in
-        the database and if not then request if from the originating server of
-        that PDU.
-
-        If a PDU fails its content hash check then it is redacted.
-
-        The given list of PDUs are not modified, instead the function returns
-        a new list.
-
-        Args:
-            origin
-            pdu
-            room_version
-            outlier: Whether the events are outliers or not
-            include_none: Whether to include None in the returned list
-                for events that have failed their checks
-
-        Returns:
-            Deferred : A list of PDUs that have valid signatures and hashes.
-        """
-        deferreds = self._check_sigs_and_hashes(room_version, pdus)
-
-        @defer.inlineCallbacks
-        def handle_check_result(pdu: EventBase, deferred: Deferred):
-            try:
-                res = yield make_deferred_yieldable(deferred)
-            except SynapseError:
-                res = None
-
-            if not res:
-                # Check local db.
-                res = yield self.store.get_event(
-                    pdu.event_id, allow_rejected=True, allow_none=True
-                )
-
-            if not res and pdu.origin != origin:
-                try:
-                    # This should not exist in the base implementation, until
-                    # this is fixed, ignore it for typing. See issue #6997.
-                    res = yield defer.ensureDeferred(
-                        self.get_pdu(  # type: ignore
-                            destinations=[pdu.origin],
-                            event_id=pdu.event_id,
-                            room_version=room_version,
-                            outlier=outlier,
-                            timeout=10000,
-                        )
-                    )
-                except SynapseError:
-                    pass
-
-            if not res:
-                logger.warning(
-                    "Failed to find copy of %s with valid signature", pdu.event_id
-                )
-
-            return res
-
-        handle = preserve_fn(handle_check_result)
-        deferreds2 = [handle(pdu, deferred) for pdu, deferred in zip(pdus, deferreds)]
-
-        valid_pdus = yield make_deferred_yieldable(
-            defer.gatherResults(deferreds2, consumeErrors=True)
-        ).addErrback(unwrapFirstError)
-
-        if include_none:
-            return valid_pdus
-        else:
-            return [p for p in valid_pdus if p]
-
     def _check_sigs_and_hash(self, room_version: str, pdu: EventBase) -> Deferred:
         return make_deferred_yieldable(
             self._check_sigs_and_hashes(room_version, [pdu])[0]

synapse/federation/federation_client.py

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ from typing import (
 from prometheus_client import Counter
 
 from twisted.internet import defer
+from twisted.internet.defer import Deferred
 
 from synapse.api.constants import EventTypes, Membership
 from synapse.api.errors import (
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ from synapse.api.room_versions import (
 )
 from synapse.events import EventBase, builder
 from synapse.federation.federation_base import FederationBase, event_from_pdu_json
-from synapse.logging.context import make_deferred_yieldable
+from synapse.logging.context import make_deferred_yieldable, preserve_fn
 from synapse.logging.utils import log_function
 from synapse.types import JsonDict
 from synapse.util import unwrapFirstError
@@ -345,6 +346,83 @@ class FederationClient(FederationBase):
 
         return state_event_ids, auth_event_ids
 
+    async def _check_sigs_and_hash_and_fetch(
+        self,
+        origin: str,
+        pdus: List[EventBase],
+        room_version: str,
+        outlier: bool = False,
+        include_none: bool = False,
+    ) -> List[EventBase]:
+        """Takes a list of PDUs and checks the signatures and hashs of each
+        one. If a PDU fails its signature check then we check if we have it in
+        the database and if not then request if from the originating server of
+        that PDU.
+
+        If a PDU fails its content hash check then it is redacted.
+
+        The given list of PDUs are not modified, instead the function returns
+        a new list.
+
+        Args:
+            origin
+            pdu
+            room_version
+            outlier: Whether the events are outliers or not
+            include_none: Whether to include None in the returned list
+                for events that have failed their checks
+
+        Returns:
+            Deferred : A list of PDUs that have valid signatures and hashes.
+        """
+        deferreds = self._check_sigs_and_hashes(room_version, pdus)
+
+        @defer.inlineCallbacks
+        def handle_check_result(pdu: EventBase, deferred: Deferred):
+            try:
+                res = yield make_deferred_yieldable(deferred)
+            except SynapseError:
+                res = None
+
+            if not res:
+                # Check local db.
+                res = yield self.store.get_event(
+                    pdu.event_id, allow_rejected=True, allow_none=True
+                )
+
+            if not res and pdu.origin != origin:
+                try:
+                    res = yield defer.ensureDeferred(
+                        self.get_pdu(
+                            destinations=[pdu.origin],
+                            event_id=pdu.event_id,
+                            room_version=room_version,  # type: ignore
+                            outlier=outlier,
+                            timeout=10000,
+                        )
+                    )
+                except SynapseError:
+                    pass
+
+            if not res:
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Failed to find copy of %s with valid signature", pdu.event_id
+                )
+
+            return res
+
+        handle = preserve_fn(handle_check_result)
+        deferreds2 = [handle(pdu, deferred) for pdu, deferred in zip(pdus, deferreds)]
+
+        valid_pdus = await make_deferred_yieldable(
+            defer.gatherResults(deferreds2, consumeErrors=True)
+        ).addErrback(unwrapFirstError)
+
+        if include_none:
+            return valid_pdus
+        else:
+            return [p for p in valid_pdus if p]
+
     async def get_event_auth(self, destination, room_id, event_id):
         res = await self.transport_layer.get_event_auth(destination, room_id, event_id)
 

synapse/federation/federation_server.py

@@ -470,57 +470,6 @@ class FederationServer(FederationBase):
             res = {"auth_chain": [a.get_pdu_json(time_now) for a in auth_pdus]}
         return 200, res
 
-    async def on_query_auth_request(self, origin, content, room_id, event_id):
-        """
-        Content is a dict with keys::
-            auth_chain (list): A list of events that give the auth chain.
-            missing (list): A list of event_ids indicating what the other
-              side (`origin`) think we're missing.
-            rejects (dict): A mapping from event_id to a 2-tuple of reason
-              string and a proof (or None) of why the event was rejected.
-              The keys of this dict give the list of events the `origin` has
-              rejected.
-
-        Args:
-            origin (str)
-            content (dict)
-            event_id (str)
-
-        Returns:
-            Deferred: Results in `dict` with the same format as `content`
-        """
-        with (await self._server_linearizer.queue((origin, room_id))):
-            origin_host, _ = parse_server_name(origin)
-            await self.check_server_matches_acl(origin_host, room_id)
-
-            room_version = await self.store.get_room_version(room_id)
-
-            auth_chain = [
-                event_from_pdu_json(e, room_version) for e in content["auth_chain"]
-            ]
-
-            signed_auth = await self._check_sigs_and_hash_and_fetch(
-                origin, auth_chain, outlier=True, room_version=room_version.identifier
-            )
-
-            ret = await self.handler.on_query_auth(
-                origin,
-                event_id,
-                room_id,
-                signed_auth,
-                content.get("rejects", []),
-                content.get("missing", []),
-            )
-
-            time_now = self._clock.time_msec()
-            send_content = {
-                "auth_chain": [e.get_pdu_json(time_now) for e in ret["auth_chain"]],
-                "rejects": ret.get("rejects", []),
-                "missing": ret.get("missing", []),
-            }
-
-        return 200, send_content
-
     @log_function
     def on_query_client_keys(self, origin, content):
         return self.on_query_request("client_keys", content)

synapse/federation/transport/server.py

@@ -643,17 +643,6 @@ class FederationClientKeysClaimServlet(BaseFederationServlet):
         return 200, response
 
 
-class FederationQueryAuthServlet(BaseFederationServlet):
-    PATH = "/query_auth/(?P<context>[^/]*)/(?P<event_id>[^/]*)"
-
-    async def on_POST(self, origin, content, query, context, event_id):
-        new_content = await self.handler.on_query_auth_request(
-            origin, content, context, event_id
-        )
-
-        return 200, new_content
-
-
 class FederationGetMissingEventsServlet(BaseFederationServlet):
     # TODO(paul): Why does this path alone end with "/?" optional?
     PATH = "/get_missing_events/(?P<room_id>[^/]*)/?"
@@ -1412,7 +1401,6 @@ FEDERATION_SERVLET_CLASSES = (
     FederationV2SendLeaveServlet,
     FederationV1InviteServlet,
     FederationV2InviteServlet,
-    FederationQueryAuthServlet,
     FederationGetMissingEventsServlet,
     FederationEventAuthServlet,
     FederationClientKeysQueryServlet,

synapse/handlers/account_validity.py

@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ class AccountValidityHandler(object):
 
         self._account_validity = self.hs.config.account_validity
 
-        if self._account_validity.renew_by_email_enabled and load_jinja2_templates:
+        if (
+            self._account_validity.enabled
+            and self._account_validity.renew_by_email_enabled
+            and load_jinja2_templates
+        ):
             # Don't do email-specific configuration if renewal by email is disabled.
             try:
                 app_name = self.hs.config.email_app_name

synapse/handlers/auth.py

@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ import logging
 import time
 import unicodedata
 import urllib.parse
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Dict, Iterable, List, Optional
 
 import attr
-import bcrypt
+import bcrypt  # type: ignore[import]
 import pymacaroons
 
 from twisted.internet import defer
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest
 from synapse.logging.context import defer_to_thread
 from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi
 from synapse.push.mailer import load_jinja2_templates
-from synapse.types import UserID
+from synapse.types import Requester, UserID
 from synapse.util.caches.expiringcache import ExpiringCache
 
 from ._base import BaseHandler
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         """
         super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs)
 
-        self.checkers = {}  # type: dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker]
+        self.checkers = {}  # type: Dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker]
         for auth_checker_class in INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS:
             inst = auth_checker_class(hs)
             if inst.is_enabled():
-                self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst
+                self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst  # type: ignore
 
         self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds
 
@@ -124,7 +124,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         self._whitelisted_sso_clients = tuple(hs.config.sso_client_whitelist)
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def validate_user_via_ui_auth(self, requester, request_body, clientip):
+    def validate_user_via_ui_auth(
+        self, requester: Requester, request_body: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
+    ):
         """
         Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth.
 
@@ -133,11 +135,11 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them.
 
         Args:
-            requester (Requester): The user, as given by the access token
+            requester: The user, as given by the access token
 
-            request_body (dict): The body of the request sent by the client
+            request_body: The body of the request sent by the client
 
-            clientip (str): The IP address of the client.
+            clientip: The IP address of the client.
 
         Returns:
             defer.Deferred[dict]: the parameters for this request (which may
@@ -208,7 +210,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         return self.checkers.keys()
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def check_auth(self, flows, clientdict, clientip):
+    def check_auth(
+        self, flows: List[List[str]], clientdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
+    ):
         """
         Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
         protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow.
@@ -223,14 +227,14 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         decorator.
 
         Args:
-            flows (list): A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
+            flows: A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
-                          strings representing auth-types. At least one full
+                   strings representing auth-types. At least one full
-                          flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
+                   flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
 
             clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the
                         'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent.
 
-            clientip (str): The IP address of the client.
+            clientip: The IP address of the client.
 
         Returns:
             defer.Deferred[dict, dict, str]: a deferred tuple of
@@ -250,7 +254,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         """
 
         authdict = None
-        sid = None
+        sid = None  # type: Optional[str]
         if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
             authdict = clientdict["auth"]
             del clientdict["auth"]
@@ -283,9 +287,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         creds = session["creds"]
 
         # check auth type currently being presented
-        errordict = {}
+        errordict = {}  # type: Dict[str, Any]
         if "type" in authdict:
-            login_type = authdict["type"]
+            login_type = authdict["type"]  # type: str
             try:
                 result = yield self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip)
                 if result:
@@ -326,7 +330,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(ret)
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def add_oob_auth(self, stagetype, authdict, clientip):
+    def add_oob_auth(self, stagetype: str, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str):
         """
         Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth
         session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth.
@@ -348,7 +352,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
             return True
         return False
 
-    def get_session_id(self, clientdict):
+    def get_session_id(self, clientdict: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
         """
         Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary
 
@@ -356,7 +360,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
             clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request
 
         Returns:
-            str|None: The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
+            The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
                 not send a session ID, returns None.
         """
         sid = None
@@ -366,40 +370,42 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
                 sid = authdict["session"]
         return sid
 
-    def set_session_data(self, session_id, key, value):
+    def set_session_data(self, session_id: str, key: str, value: Any) -> None:
         """
         Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this
         request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by
         the client.
 
         Args:
-            session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
+            session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
-            key (string): The key to store the data under
+            key: The key to store the data under
-            value (any): The data to store
+            value: The data to store
         """
         sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
         sess.setdefault("serverdict", {})[key] = value
         self._save_session(sess)
 
-    def get_session_data(self, session_id, key, default=None):
+    def get_session_data(
+        self, session_id: str, key: str, default: Optional[Any] = None
+    ) -> Any:
         """
         Retrieve data stored with set_session_data
 
         Args:
-            session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
+            session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
-            key (string): The key to store the data under
+            key: The key to store the data under
-            default (any): Value to return if the key has not been set
+            default: Value to return if the key has not been set
         """
         sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
         return sess.setdefault("serverdict", {}).get(key, default)
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def _check_auth_dict(self, authdict, clientip):
+    def _check_auth_dict(self, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str):
         """Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client
 
         Args:
-            authdict (object): auth dict provided by the client
+            authdict: auth dict provided by the client
-            clientip (str): IP address of the client
+            clientip: IP address of the client
 
         Returns:
             Deferred: result of the stage verification.
@@ -425,10 +431,10 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         (canonical_id, callback) = yield self.validate_login(user_id, authdict)
         return canonical_id
 
-    def _get_params_recaptcha(self):
+    def _get_params_recaptcha(self) -> dict:
         return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key}
 
-    def _get_params_terms(self):
+    def _get_params_terms(self) -> dict:
         return {
             "policies": {
                 "privacy_policy": {
@@ -445,7 +451,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
             }
         }
 
-    def _auth_dict_for_flows(self, flows, session):
+    def _auth_dict_for_flows(
+        self, flows: List[List[str]], session: Dict[str, Any]
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         public_flows = []
         for f in flows:
             public_flows.append(f)
@@ -455,7 +463,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
             LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms,
         }
 
-        params = {}
+        params = {}  # type: Dict[str, Any]
 
         for f in public_flows:
             for stage in f:
@@ -468,7 +476,13 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
             "params": params,
         }
 
-    def _get_session_info(self, session_id):
+    def _get_session_info(self, session_id: Optional[str]) -> dict:
+        """
+        Gets or creates a session given a session ID.
+
+        The session can be used to track data across multiple requests, e.g. for
+        interactive authentication.
+        """
         if session_id not in self.sessions:
             session_id = None
 
@@ -481,7 +495,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         return self.sessions[session_id]
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def get_access_token_for_user_id(self, user_id, device_id, valid_until_ms):
+    def get_access_token_for_user_id(
+        self, user_id: str, device_id: Optional[str], valid_until_ms: Optional[int]
+    ):
         """
         Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID.
 
@@ -491,11 +507,11 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already.
 
         Args:
-            user_id (str): canonical User ID
+            user_id: canonical User ID
-            device_id (str|None): the device ID to associate with the tokens.
+            device_id: the device ID to associate with the tokens.
                None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated:
                we should always have a device ID)
-            valid_until_ms (int|None): when the token is valid until. None for
+            valid_until_ms: when the token is valid until. None for
                 no expiry.
         Returns:
               The access token for the user's session.
@@ -530,13 +546,13 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         return access_token
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def check_user_exists(self, user_id):
+    def check_user_exists(self, user_id: str):
         """
         Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
         insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches.
 
         Args:
-            (unicode|bytes) user_id: complete @user:id
+            user_id: complete @user:id
 
         Returns:
             defer.Deferred: (unicode) canonical_user_id, or None if zero or
@@ -551,7 +567,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         return None
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(self, user_id):
+    def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(self, user_id: str):
         """Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
         insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact
         matches.
@@ -581,7 +597,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
             )
         return result
 
-    def get_supported_login_types(self):
+    def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Iterable[str]:
         """Get a the login types supported for the /login API
 
         By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is
@@ -589,20 +605,20 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         other login types.
 
         Returns:
-            Iterable[str]: login types
+            login types
         """
         return self._supported_login_types
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def validate_login(self, username, login_submission):
+    def validate_login(self, username: str, login_submission: Dict[str, Any]):
         """Authenticates the user for the /login API
 
         Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate
         m.login.password auth types.
 
         Args:
-            username (str): username supplied by the user
+            username: username supplied by the user
-            login_submission (dict): the whole of the login submission
+            login_submission: the whole of the login submission
                 (including 'type' and other relevant fields)
         Returns:
             Deferred[str, func]: canonical user id, and optional callback
@@ -690,13 +706,13 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         raise LoginError(403, "Invalid password", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def check_password_provider_3pid(self, medium, address, password):
+    def check_password_provider_3pid(self, medium: str, address: str, password: str):
         """Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login
 
         Args:
-            medium (str): The medium of the 3pid (ex. email).
+            medium: The medium of the 3pid (ex. email).
-            address (str): The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com).
+            address: The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com).
-            password (str): The password of the user.
+            password: The password of the user.
 
         Returns:
             Deferred[(str|None, func|None)]: A tuple of `(user_id,
@@ -724,15 +740,15 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         return None, None
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def _check_local_password(self, user_id, password):
+    def _check_local_password(self, user_id: str, password: str):
         """Authenticate a user against the local password database.
 
         user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are
         multiple inexact matches.
 
         Args:
-            user_id (unicode): complete @user:id
+            user_id: complete @user:id
-            password (unicode): the provided password
+            password: the provided password
         Returns:
             Deferred[unicode] the canonical_user_id, or Deferred[None] if
                 unknown user/bad password
@@ -755,7 +771,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         return user_id
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token):
+    def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token: str):
         auth_api = self.hs.get_auth()
         user_id = None
         try:
@@ -769,11 +785,11 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         return user_id
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def delete_access_token(self, access_token):
+    def delete_access_token(self, access_token: str):
         """Invalidate a single access token
 
         Args:
-            access_token (str): access token to be deleted
+            access_token: access token to be deleted
 
         Returns:
             Deferred
@@ -798,15 +814,17 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
     def delete_access_tokens_for_user(
-        self, user_id, except_token_id=None, device_id=None
+        self,
+        user_id: str,
+        except_token_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        device_id: Optional[str] = None,
     ):
         """Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user
 
         Args:
-            user_id (str):  ID of user the tokens belong to
+            user_id:  ID of user the tokens belong to
-            except_token_id (str|None): access_token ID which should *not* be
+            except_token_id: access_token ID which should *not* be deleted
-                deleted
+            device_id:  ID of device the tokens are associated with.
-            device_id (str|None):  ID of device the tokens are associated with.
                 If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will
                 be deleted
         Returns:
@@ -830,7 +848,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         )
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def add_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, validated_at):
+    def add_threepid(self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, validated_at: int):
         # check if medium has a valid value
         if medium not in ["email", "msisdn"]:
             raise SynapseError(
@@ -856,19 +874,20 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         )
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def delete_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, id_server=None):
+    def delete_threepid(
+        self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, id_server: Optional[str] = None
+    ):
         """Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it
         from the local database.
 
         Args:
-            user_id (str)
+            user_id: ID of user to remove the 3pid from.
-            medium (str)
+            medium: The medium of the 3pid being removed: "email" or "msisdn".
-            address (str)
+            address: The 3pid address to remove.
-            id_server (str|None): Use the given identity server when unbinding
+            id_server: Use the given identity server when unbinding
                 any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the
                 identity server specified when binding (if known).
 
-
         Returns:
             Deferred[bool]: Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on
             the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the
@@ -887,17 +906,18 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
         yield self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address)
         return result
 
-    def _save_session(self, session):
+    def _save_session(self, session: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Update the last used time on the session to now and add it back to the session store."""
         # TODO: Persistent storage
         logger.debug("Saving session %s", session)
         session["last_used"] = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
         self.sessions[session["id"]] = session
 
-    def hash(self, password):
+    def hash(self, password: str):
         """Computes a secure hash of password.
 
         Args:
-            password (unicode): Password to hash.
+            password: Password to hash.
 
         Returns:
             Deferred(unicode): Hashed password.
@@ -914,12 +934,12 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
 
         return defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash)
 
-    def validate_hash(self, password, stored_hash):
+    def validate_hash(self, password: str, stored_hash: bytes):
         """Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
 
         Args:
-            password (unicode): Password to hash.
+            password: Password to hash.
-            stored_hash (bytes): Expected hash value.
+            stored_hash: Expected hash value.
 
         Returns:
             Deferred(bool): Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
@@ -1007,7 +1027,9 @@ class MacaroonGenerator(object):
 
     hs = attr.ib()
 
-    def generate_access_token(self, user_id, extra_caveats=None):
+    def generate_access_token(
+        self, user_id: str, extra_caveats: Optional[List[str]] = None
+    ) -> str:
         extra_caveats = extra_caveats or []
         macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
         macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access")
@@ -1020,16 +1042,9 @@ class MacaroonGenerator(object):
             macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat)
         return macaroon.serialize()
 
-    def generate_short_term_login_token(self, user_id, duration_in_ms=(2 * 60 * 1000)):
+    def generate_short_term_login_token(
-        """
+        self, user_id: str, duration_in_ms: int = (2 * 60 * 1000)
-
+    ) -> str:
-        Args:
-            user_id (unicode):
-            duration_in_ms (int):
-
-        Returns:
-            unicode
-        """
         macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
         macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login")
         now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
@@ -1037,12 +1052,12 @@ class MacaroonGenerator(object):
         macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
         return macaroon.serialize()
 
-    def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id):
+    def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id: str) -> str:
         macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
         macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher")
         return macaroon.serialize()
 
-    def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id):
+    def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id: str) -> pymacaroons.Macaroon:
         macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon(
             location=self.hs.config.server_name,
             identifier="key",

synapse/handlers/room.py

@@ -292,16 +292,6 @@ class RoomCreationHandler(BaseHandler):
             except AuthError as e:
                 logger.warning("Unable to update PLs in old room: %s", e)
 
-        new_pl_content = copy_power_levels_contents(old_room_pl_state.content)
-
-        # pre-msc2260 rooms may not have the right setting for aliases. If no other
-        # value is set, set it now.
-        events_default = new_pl_content.get("events_default", 0)
-        new_pl_content.setdefault("events", {}).setdefault(
-            EventTypes.Aliases, events_default
-        )
-
-        logger.debug("Setting correct PLs in new room to %s", new_pl_content)
         yield self.event_creation_handler.create_and_send_nonmember_event(
             requester,
             {
@@ -309,7 +299,7 @@ class RoomCreationHandler(BaseHandler):
                 "state_key": "",
                 "room_id": new_room_id,
                 "sender": requester.user.to_string(),
-                "content": new_pl_content,
+                "content": old_room_pl_state.content,
             },
             ratelimit=False,
         )
@@ -814,10 +804,6 @@ class RoomCreationHandler(BaseHandler):
                     EventTypes.RoomHistoryVisibility: 100,
                     EventTypes.CanonicalAlias: 50,
                     EventTypes.RoomAvatar: 50,
-                    # MSC2260: Allow everybody to send alias events by default
-                    # This will be reudundant on pre-MSC2260 rooms, since the
-                    # aliases event is special-cased.
-                    EventTypes.Aliases: 0,
                     EventTypes.Tombstone: 100,
                     EventTypes.ServerACL: 100,
                 },

synapse/handlers/saml_handler.py

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ from saml2.client import Saml2Client
 
 from synapse.api.errors import SynapseError
 from synapse.config import ConfigError
+from synapse.http.server import finish_request
 from synapse.http.servlet import parse_string
 from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi
 from synapse.types import (
@@ -73,6 +74,8 @@ class SamlHandler:
         # a lock on the mappings
         self._mapping_lock = Linearizer(name="saml_mapping", clock=self._clock)
 
+        self._error_html_content = hs.config.saml2_error_html_content
+
     def handle_redirect_request(self, client_redirect_url):
         """Handle an incoming request to /login/sso/redirect
 
@@ -114,7 +117,22 @@ class SamlHandler:
         # the dict.
         self.expire_sessions()
 
-        user_id = await self._map_saml_response_to_user(resp_bytes, relay_state)
+        try:
+            user_id = await self._map_saml_response_to_user(resp_bytes, relay_state)
+        except Exception as e:
+            # If decoding the response or mapping it to a user failed, then log the
+            # error and tell the user that something went wrong.
+            logger.error(e)
+
+            request.setResponseCode(400)
+            request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", b"text/html; charset=utf-8")
+            request.setHeader(
+                b"Content-Length", b"%d" % (len(self._error_html_content),)
+            )
+            request.write(self._error_html_content.encode("utf8"))
+            finish_request(request)
+            return
+
         self._auth_handler.complete_sso_login(user_id, request, relay_state)
 
     async def _map_saml_response_to_user(self, resp_bytes, client_redirect_url):

synapse/handlers/set_password.py

@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 import logging
+from typing import Optional
 
 from twisted.internet import defer
 
 from synapse.api.errors import Codes, StoreError, SynapseError
+from synapse.types import Requester
 
 from ._base import BaseHandler
 
@@ -32,14 +34,17 @@ class SetPasswordHandler(BaseHandler):
         self._device_handler = hs.get_device_handler()
 
     @defer.inlineCallbacks
-    def set_password(self, user_id, newpassword, requester=None):
+    def set_password(
+        self,
+        user_id: str,
+        new_password: str,
+        logout_devices: bool,
+        requester: Optional[Requester] = None,
+    ):
         if not self.hs.config.password_localdb_enabled:
             raise SynapseError(403, "Password change disabled", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
 
-        password_hash = yield self._auth_handler.hash(newpassword)
+        password_hash = yield self._auth_handler.hash(new_password)
-
-        except_device_id = requester.device_id if requester else None
-        except_access_token_id = requester.access_token_id if requester else None
 
         try:
             yield self.store.user_set_password_hash(user_id, password_hash)
@@ -48,14 +53,18 @@ class SetPasswordHandler(BaseHandler):
                 raise SynapseError(404, "Unknown user", Codes.NOT_FOUND)
             raise e
 
-        # we want to log out all of the user's other sessions. First delete
+        # Optionally, log out all of the user's other sessions.
-        # all his other devices.
+        if logout_devices:
-        yield self._device_handler.delete_all_devices_for_user(
+            except_device_id = requester.device_id if requester else None
-            user_id, except_device_id=except_device_id
+            except_access_token_id = requester.access_token_id if requester else None
-        )
 
-        # and now delete any access tokens which weren't associated with
+            # First delete all of their other devices.
-        # devices (or were associated with this device).
+            yield self._device_handler.delete_all_devices_for_user(
-        yield self._auth_handler.delete_access_tokens_for_user(
+                user_id, except_device_id=except_device_id
-            user_id, except_token_id=except_access_token_id
+            )
-        )
+
+            # and now delete any access tokens which weren't associated with
+            # devices (or were associated with this device).
+            yield self._auth_handler.delete_access_tokens_for_user(
+                user_id, except_token_id=except_access_token_id
+            )

synapse/http/client.py

@@ -244,9 +244,6 @@ class SimpleHttpClient(object):
         pool.maxPersistentPerHost = max((100 * CACHE_SIZE_FACTOR, 5))
         pool.cachedConnectionTimeout = 2 * 60
 
-        # The default context factory in Twisted 14.0.0 (which we require) is
-        # BrowserLikePolicyForHTTPS which will do regular cert validation
-        # 'like a browser'
         self.agent = ProxyAgent(
             self.reactor,
             connectTimeout=15,

synapse/http/federation/matrix_federation_agent.py

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ class MatrixFederationAgent(object):
     Args:
         reactor (IReactor): twisted reactor to use for underlying requests
 
-        tls_client_options_factory (ClientTLSOptionsFactory|None):
+        tls_client_options_factory (FederationPolicyForHTTPS|None):
             factory to use for fetching client tls options, or none to disable TLS.
 
         _srv_resolver (SrvResolver|None):

synapse/logging/context.py

@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ class LoggingContext(object):
     class Sentinel(object):
         """Sentinel to represent the root context"""
 
-        __slots__ = ["previous_context", "alive", "request", "scope"]
+        __slots__ = ["previous_context", "alive", "request", "scope", "tag"]
 
         def __init__(self) -> None:
             # Minimal set for compatibility with LoggingContext
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ class LoggingContext(object):
             self.alive = None
             self.request = None
             self.scope = None
+            self.tag = None
 
         def __str__(self):
             return "sentinel"
@@ -511,7 +512,7 @@ class PreserveLoggingContext(object):
 
     __slots__ = ["current_context", "new_context", "has_parent"]
 
-    def __init__(self, new_context: Optional[LoggingContext] = None) -> None:
+    def __init__(self, new_context: Optional[LoggingContextOrSentinel] = None) -> None:
         if new_context is None:
             self.new_context = LoggingContext.sentinel  # type: LoggingContextOrSentinel
         else:

synapse/res/templates/saml_error.html

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 <body>
     <p>Oops! Something went wrong during authentication<span id="errormsg"></span>.</p>
     <p>
-        If you're seeing this page after clicking a link sent to you via email, make
+        If you are seeing this page after clicking a link sent to you via email, make
         sure you only click the confirmation link once, and that you open the
         validation link in the same client you're logging in from.
     </p>
@@ -24,19 +24,22 @@
         // we just don't print anything specific.
         let searchStr = "";
         if (window.location.search) {
-            // For some reason window.location.searchParams isn't always defined when
+            // window.location.searchParams isn't always defined when
-            // window.location.search is, so we can't just use it right away.
+            // window.location.search is, so it's more reliable to parse the latter.
             searchStr = window.location.search;
         } else if (window.location.hash) {
-            //
+            // Replace the # with a ? so that URLSearchParams does the right thing and
+            // doesn't parse the first parameter incorrectly.
             searchStr = window.location.hash.replace("#", "?");
         }
 
+        // We might end up with no error in the URL, so we need to check if we have one
+        // to print one.
         let errorDesc = new URLSearchParams(searchStr).get("error_description")
-
         if (errorDesc) {
-            document.getElementById("errormsg").innerHTML = ` ("${errorDesc}")`;
+
+            document.getElementById("errormsg").innerText = ` ("${errorDesc}")`;
         }
     </script>
 </body>
-</html>
+</html>

synapse/rest/admin/users.py

@@ -221,8 +221,9 @@ class UserRestServletV2(RestServlet):
                     raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid password")
                 else:
                     new_password = body["password"]
+                    logout_devices = True
                     await self.set_password_handler.set_password(
-                        target_user.to_string(), new_password, requester
+                        target_user.to_string(), new_password, logout_devices, requester
                     )
 
             if "deactivated" in body:
@@ -536,9 +537,10 @@ class ResetPasswordRestServlet(RestServlet):
         params = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
         assert_params_in_dict(params, ["new_password"])
         new_password = params["new_password"]
+        logout_devices = params.get("logout_devices", True)
 
         await self._set_password_handler.set_password(
-            target_user_id, new_password, requester
+            target_user_id, new_password, logout_devices, requester
         )
         return 200, {}
 

synapse/rest/client/v1/room.py

@@ -189,12 +189,6 @@ class RoomStateEventRestServlet(TransactionRestServlet):
 
         content = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
 
-        if event_type == EventTypes.Aliases:
-            # MSC2260
-            raise SynapseError(
-                400, "Cannot send m.room.aliases events via /rooms/{room_id}/state"
-            )
-
         event_dict = {
             "type": event_type,
             "content": content,
@@ -242,12 +236,6 @@ class RoomSendEventRestServlet(TransactionRestServlet):
         requester = await self.auth.get_user_by_req(request, allow_guest=True)
         content = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
 
-        if event_type == EventTypes.Aliases:
-            # MSC2260
-            raise SynapseError(
-                400, "Cannot send m.room.aliases events via /rooms/{room_id}/send"
-            )
-
         event_dict = {
             "type": event_type,
             "content": content,

synapse/rest/client/v2_alpha/account.py

@@ -265,8 +265,11 @@ class PasswordRestServlet(RestServlet):
 
         assert_params_in_dict(params, ["new_password"])
         new_password = params["new_password"]
+        logout_devices = params.get("logout_devices", True)
 
-        await self._set_password_handler.set_password(user_id, new_password, requester)
+        await self._set_password_handler.set_password(
+            user_id, new_password, logout_devices, requester
+        )
 
         return 200, {}
 

synapse/rest/media/v1/_base.py

@@ -30,6 +30,22 @@ from synapse.util.stringutils import is_ascii
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
+# list all text content types that will have the charset default to UTF-8 when
+# none is given
+TEXT_CONTENT_TYPES = [
+    "text/css",
+    "text/csv",
+    "text/html",
+    "text/calendar",
+    "text/plain",
+    "text/javascript",
+    "application/json",
+    "application/ld+json",
+    "application/rtf",
+    "image/svg+xml",
+    "text/xml",
+]
+
 
 def parse_media_id(request):
     try:
@@ -96,7 +112,14 @@ def add_file_headers(request, media_type, file_size, upload_name):
     def _quote(x):
         return urllib.parse.quote(x.encode("utf-8"))
 
-    request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", media_type.encode("UTF-8"))
+    # Default to a UTF-8 charset for text content types.
+    # ex, uses UTF-8 for 'text/css' but not 'text/css; charset=UTF-16'
+    if media_type.lower() in TEXT_CONTENT_TYPES:
+        content_type = media_type + "; charset=UTF-8"
+    else:
+        content_type = media_type
+
+    request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", content_type.encode("UTF-8"))
     if upload_name:
         # RFC6266 section 4.1 [1] defines both `filename` and `filename*`.
         #

synapse/rest/saml2/response_resource.py

@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 
-from synapse.http.server import DirectServeResource, wrap_html_request_handler
+from synapse.http.server import (
+    DirectServeResource,
+    finish_request,
+    wrap_html_request_handler,
+)
 
 
 class SAML2ResponseResource(DirectServeResource):
@@ -24,8 +28,20 @@ class SAML2ResponseResource(DirectServeResource):
 
     def __init__(self, hs):
         super().__init__()
+        self._error_html_content = hs.config.saml2_error_html_content
         self._saml_handler = hs.get_saml_handler()
 
+    async def _async_render_GET(self, request):
+        # We're not expecting any GET request on that resource if everything goes right,
+        # but some IdPs sometimes end up responding with a 302 redirect on this endpoint.
+        # In this case, just tell the user that something went wrong and they should
+        # try to authenticate again.
+        request.setResponseCode(400)
+        request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", b"text/html; charset=utf-8")
+        request.setHeader(b"Content-Length", b"%d" % (len(self._error_html_content),))
+        request.write(self._error_html_content.encode("utf8"))
+        finish_request(request)
+
     @wrap_html_request_handler
     async def _async_render_POST(self, request):
         return await self._saml_handler.handle_saml_response(request)

synapse/server.py

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ import logging
 import os
 
 from twisted.mail.smtp import sendmail
-from twisted.web.client import BrowserLikePolicyForHTTPS
 
 from synapse.api.auth import Auth
 from synapse.api.filtering import Filtering
@@ -35,6 +34,7 @@ from synapse.appservice.api import ApplicationServiceApi
 from synapse.appservice.scheduler import ApplicationServiceScheduler
 from synapse.config.homeserver import HomeServerConfig
 from synapse.crypto import context_factory
+from synapse.crypto.context_factory import RegularPolicyForHTTPS
 from synapse.crypto.keyring import Keyring
 from synapse.events.builder import EventBuilderFactory
 from synapse.events.spamcheck import SpamChecker
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ class HomeServer(object):
         return (
             InsecureInterceptableContextFactory()
             if self.config.use_insecure_ssl_client_just_for_testing_do_not_use
-            else BrowserLikePolicyForHTTPS()
+            else RegularPolicyForHTTPS()
         )
 
     def build_simple_http_client(self):
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ class HomeServer(object):
         return PusherPool(self)
 
     def build_http_client(self):
-        tls_client_options_factory = context_factory.ClientTLSOptionsFactory(
+        tls_client_options_factory = context_factory.FederationPolicyForHTTPS(
             self.config
         )
         return MatrixFederationHttpClient(self, tls_client_options_factory)

synapse/state/__init__.py

@@ -662,28 +662,16 @@ class StateResolutionStore(object):
             allow_rejected=allow_rejected,
         )
 
-    def get_auth_chain(self, event_ids: List[str], ignore_events: Set[str]):
+    def get_auth_chain_difference(self, state_sets: List[Set[str]]):
-        """Gets the full auth chain for a set of events (including rejected
+        """Given sets of state events figure out the auth chain difference (as
-        events).
+        per state res v2 algorithm).
-
-        Includes the given event IDs in the result.
-
-        Note that:
-            1. All events must be state events.
-            2. For v1 rooms this may not have the full auth chain in the
-               presence of rejected events
-
-        Args:
-            event_ids: The event IDs of the events to fetch the auth chain for.
-                Must be state events.
-            ignore_events: Set of events to exclude from the returned auth
-                chain.
 
+        This equivalent to fetching the full auth chain for each set of state
+        and returning the events that don't appear in each and every auth
+        chain.
 
         Returns:
-            Deferred[list[str]]: List of event IDs of the auth chain.
+            Deferred[Set[str]]: Set of event IDs.
         """
 
-        return self.store.get_auth_chain_ids(
+        return self.store.get_auth_chain_difference(state_sets)
-            event_ids, include_given=True, ignore_events=ignore_events,
-        )

synapse/state/v2.py

@@ -227,36 +227,12 @@ def _get_auth_chain_difference(state_sets, event_map, state_res_store):
     Returns:
         Deferred[set[str]]: Set of event IDs
     """
-    common = set(itervalues(state_sets[0])).intersection(
+
-        *(itervalues(s) for s in state_sets[1:])
+    difference = yield state_res_store.get_auth_chain_difference(
+        [set(state_set.values()) for state_set in state_sets]
     )
 
-    auth_sets = []
+    return difference
-    for state_set in state_sets:
-        auth_ids = {
-            eid
-            for key, eid in iteritems(state_set)
-            if (
-                key[0] in (EventTypes.Member, EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite)
-                or key
-                in (
-                    (EventTypes.PowerLevels, ""),
-                    (EventTypes.Create, ""),
-                    (EventTypes.JoinRules, ""),
-                )
-            )
-            and eid not in common
-        }
-
-        auth_chain = yield state_res_store.get_auth_chain(auth_ids, common)
-        auth_ids.update(auth_chain)
-
-        auth_sets.append(auth_ids)
-
-    intersection = set(auth_sets[0]).intersection(*auth_sets[1:])
-    union = set().union(*auth_sets)
-
-    return union - intersection
 
 
 def _seperate(state_sets):

synapse/storage/data_stores/main/event_federation.py

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # limitations under the License.
 import itertools
 import logging
-from typing import List, Optional, Set
+from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
 
 from six.moves.queue import Empty, PriorityQueue
 
@@ -103,6 +103,154 @@ class EventFederationWorkerStore(EventsWorkerStore, SignatureWorkerStore, SQLBas
 
         return list(results)
 
+    def get_auth_chain_difference(self, state_sets: List[Set[str]]):
+        """Given sets of state events figure out the auth chain difference (as
+        per state res v2 algorithm).
+
+        This equivalent to fetching the full auth chain for each set of state
+        and returning the events that don't appear in each and every auth
+        chain.
+
+        Returns:
+            Deferred[Set[str]]
+        """
+
+        return self.db.runInteraction(
+            "get_auth_chain_difference",
+            self._get_auth_chain_difference_txn,
+            state_sets,
+        )
+
+    def _get_auth_chain_difference_txn(
+        self, txn, state_sets: List[Set[str]]
+    ) -> Set[str]:
+
+        # Algorithm Description
+        # ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+        #
+        # The idea here is to basically walk the auth graph of each state set in
+        # tandem, keeping track of which auth events are reachable by each state
+        # set. If we reach an auth event we've already visited (via a different
+        # state set) then we mark that auth event and all ancestors as reachable
+        # by the state set. This requires that we keep track of the auth chains
+        # in memory.
+        #
+        # Doing it in a such a way means that we can stop early if all auth
+        # events we're currently walking are reachable by all state sets.
+        #
+        # *Note*: We can't stop walking an event's auth chain if it is reachable
+        # by all state sets. This is because other auth chains we're walking
+        # might be reachable only via the original auth chain. For example,
+        # given the following auth chain:
+        #
+        #       A -> C -> D -> E
+        #           /         /
+        #       B -´---------´
+        #
+        # and state sets {A} and {B} then walking the auth chains of A and B
+        # would immediately show that C is reachable by both. However, if we
+        # stopped at C then we'd only reach E via the auth chain of B and so E
+        # would errornously get included in the returned difference.
+        #
+        # The other thing that we do is limit the number of auth chains we walk
+        # at once, due to practical limits (i.e. we can only query the database
+        # with a limited set of parameters). We pick the auth chains we walk
+        # each iteration based on their depth, in the hope that events with a
+        # lower depth are likely reachable by those with higher depths.
+        #
+        # We could use any ordering that we believe would give a rough
+        # topological ordering, e.g. origin server timestamp. If the ordering
+        # chosen is not topological then the algorithm still produces the right
+        # result, but perhaps a bit more inefficiently. This is why it is safe
+        # to use "depth" here.
+
+        initial_events = set(state_sets[0]).union(*state_sets[1:])
+
+        # Dict from events in auth chains to which sets *cannot* reach them.
+        # I.e. if the set is empty then all sets can reach the event.
+        event_to_missing_sets = {
+            event_id: {i for i, a in enumerate(state_sets) if event_id not in a}
+            for event_id in initial_events
+        }
+
+        # We need to get the depth of the initial events for sorting purposes.
+        sql = """
+            SELECT depth, event_id FROM events
+            WHERE %s
+            ORDER BY depth ASC
+        """
+        clause, args = make_in_list_sql_clause(
+            txn.database_engine, "event_id", initial_events
+        )
+        txn.execute(sql % (clause,), args)
+
+        # The sorted list of events whose auth chains we should walk.
+        search = txn.fetchall()  # type: List[Tuple[int, str]]
+
+        # Map from event to its auth events
+        event_to_auth_events = {}  # type: Dict[str, Set[str]]
+
+        base_sql = """
+            SELECT a.event_id, auth_id, depth
+            FROM event_auth AS a
+            INNER JOIN events AS e ON (e.event_id = a.auth_id)
+            WHERE
+        """
+
+        while search:
+            # Check whether all our current walks are reachable by all state
+            # sets. If so we can bail.
+            if all(not event_to_missing_sets[eid] for _, eid in search):
+                break
+
+            # Fetch the auth events and their depths of the N last events we're
+            # currently walking
+            search, chunk = search[:-100], search[-100:]
+            clause, args = make_in_list_sql_clause(
+                txn.database_engine, "a.event_id", [e_id for _, e_id in chunk]
+            )
+            txn.execute(base_sql + clause, args)
+
+            for event_id, auth_event_id, auth_event_depth in txn:
+                event_to_auth_events.setdefault(event_id, set()).add(auth_event_id)
+
+                sets = event_to_missing_sets.get(auth_event_id)
+                if sets is None:
+                    # First time we're seeing this event, so we add it to the
+                    # queue of things to fetch.
+                    search.append((auth_event_depth, auth_event_id))
+
+                    # Assume that this event is unreachable from any of the
+                    # state sets until proven otherwise
+                    sets = event_to_missing_sets[auth_event_id] = set(
+                        range(len(state_sets))
+                    )
+                else:
+                    # We've previously seen this event, so look up its auth
+                    # events and recursively mark all ancestors as reachable
+                    # by the current event's state set.
+                    a_ids = event_to_auth_events.get(auth_event_id)
+                    while a_ids:
+                        new_aids = set()
+                        for a_id in a_ids:
+                            event_to_missing_sets[a_id].intersection_update(
+                                event_to_missing_sets[event_id]
+                            )
+
+                            b = event_to_auth_events.get(a_id)
+                            if b:
+                                new_aids.update(b)
+
+                        a_ids = new_aids
+
+                # Mark that the auth event is reachable by the approriate sets.
+                sets.intersection_update(event_to_missing_sets[event_id])
+
+            search.sort()
+
+        # Return all events where not all sets can reach them.
+        return {eid for eid, n in event_to_missing_sets.items() if n}
+
     def get_oldest_events_in_room(self, room_id):
         return self.db.runInteraction(
             "get_oldest_events_in_room", self._get_oldest_events_in_room_txn, room_id

synapse/storage/database.py

@@ -29,7 +29,11 @@ from twisted.internet import defer
 
 from synapse.api.errors import StoreError
 from synapse.config.database import DatabaseConnectionConfig
-from synapse.logging.context import LoggingContext, make_deferred_yieldable
+from synapse.logging.context import (
+    LoggingContext,
+    LoggingContextOrSentinel,
+    make_deferred_yieldable,
+)
 from synapse.metrics.background_process_metrics import run_as_background_process
 from synapse.storage.background_updates import BackgroundUpdater
 from synapse.storage.engines import BaseDatabaseEngine, PostgresEngine, Sqlite3Engine
@@ -543,7 +547,9 @@ class Database(object):
         Returns:
             Deferred: The result of func
         """
-        parent_context = LoggingContext.current_context()
+        parent_context = (
+            LoggingContext.current_context()
+        )  # type: Optional[LoggingContextOrSentinel]
         if parent_context == LoggingContext.sentinel:
             logger.warning(
                 "Starting db connection from sentinel context: metrics will be lost"

synapse/visibility.py

@@ -118,30 +118,36 @@ def filter_events_for_client(
 
                the original event if they can see it as normal.
         """
-        if event.type == "org.matrix.dummy_event" and filter_send_to_client:
+        # Only run some checks if these events aren't about to be sent to clients. This is
-            return None
+        # because, if this is not the case, we're probably only checking if the users can
+        # see events in the room at that point in the DAG, and that shouldn't be decided
+        # on those checks.
+        if filter_send_to_client:
+            if event.type == "org.matrix.dummy_event":
+                return None
 
-        if not event.is_state() and event.sender in ignore_list and filter_send_to_client:
+            if not event.is_state() and event.sender in ignore_list:
-            return None
+                return None
 
-        # Until MSC2261 has landed we can't redact malicious alias events, so for
+            # Until MSC2261 has landed we can't redact malicious alias events, so for
-        # now we temporarily filter out m.room.aliases entirely to mitigate
+            # now we temporarily filter out m.room.aliases entirely to mitigate
-        # abuse, while we spec a better solution to advertising aliases
+            # abuse, while we spec a better solution to advertising aliases
-        # on rooms.
+            # on rooms.
-        if event.type == EventTypes.Aliases:
+            if event.type == EventTypes.Aliases:
-            return None
+                return None
 
-        # Don't try to apply the room's retention policy if the event is a state event, as
+            # Don't try to apply the room's retention policy if the event is a state
-        # MSC1763 states that retention is only considered for non-state events.
+            # event, as MSC1763 states that retention is only considered for non-state
-        if filter_send_to_client and not event.is_state():
+            # events.
-            retention_policy = retention_policies[event.room_id]
+            if not event.is_state():
-            max_lifetime = retention_policy.get("max_lifetime")
+                retention_policy = retention_policies[event.room_id]
+                max_lifetime = retention_policy.get("max_lifetime")
 
-            if max_lifetime is not None:
+                if max_lifetime is not None:
-                oldest_allowed_ts = storage.main.clock.time_msec() - max_lifetime
+                    oldest_allowed_ts = storage.main.clock.time_msec() - max_lifetime
 
-                if event.origin_server_ts < oldest_allowed_ts:
+                    if event.origin_server_ts < oldest_allowed_ts:
-                    return None
+                        return None
 
         if event.event_id in always_include_ids:
             return event

tests/config/test_tls.py

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ from OpenSSL import SSL
 
 from synapse.config._base import Config, RootConfig
 from synapse.config.tls import ConfigError, TlsConfig
-from synapse.crypto.context_factory import ClientTLSOptionsFactory
+from synapse.crypto.context_factory import FederationPolicyForHTTPS
 
 from tests.unittest import TestCase
 
@@ -180,12 +180,13 @@ s4niecZKPBizL6aucT59CsunNmmb5Glq8rlAcU+1ZTZZzGYqVYhF6axB9Qg=
         t = TestConfig()
         t.read_config(config, config_dir_path="", data_dir_path="")
 
-        cf = ClientTLSOptionsFactory(t)
+        cf = FederationPolicyForHTTPS(t)
+        options = _get_ssl_context_options(cf._verify_ssl_context)
 
         # The context has had NO_TLSv1_1 and NO_TLSv1_0 set, but not NO_TLSv1_2
-        self.assertNotEqual(cf._verify_ssl._options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1, 0)
+        self.assertNotEqual(options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1, 0)
-        self.assertNotEqual(cf._verify_ssl._options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_1, 0)
+        self.assertNotEqual(options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_1, 0)
-        self.assertEqual(cf._verify_ssl._options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_2, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_2, 0)
 
     def test_tls_client_minimum_set_passed_through_1_0(self):
         """
@@ -195,12 +196,13 @@ s4niecZKPBizL6aucT59CsunNmmb5Glq8rlAcU+1ZTZZzGYqVYhF6axB9Qg=
         t = TestConfig()
         t.read_config(config, config_dir_path="", data_dir_path="")
 
-        cf = ClientTLSOptionsFactory(t)
+        cf = FederationPolicyForHTTPS(t)
+        options = _get_ssl_context_options(cf._verify_ssl_context)
 
         # The context has not had any of the NO_TLS set.
-        self.assertEqual(cf._verify_ssl._options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1, 0)
-        self.assertEqual(cf._verify_ssl._options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_1, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_1, 0)
-        self.assertEqual(cf._verify_ssl._options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_2, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(options & SSL.OP_NO_TLSv1_2, 0)
 
     def test_acme_disabled_in_generated_config_no_acme_domain_provied(self):
         """
@@ -273,7 +275,7 @@ s4niecZKPBizL6aucT59CsunNmmb5Glq8rlAcU+1ZTZZzGYqVYhF6axB9Qg=
         t = TestConfig()
         t.read_config(config, config_dir_path="", data_dir_path="")
 
-        cf = ClientTLSOptionsFactory(t)
+        cf = FederationPolicyForHTTPS(t)
 
         # Not in the whitelist
         opts = cf.get_options(b"notexample.com")
@@ -282,3 +284,10 @@ s4niecZKPBizL6aucT59CsunNmmb5Glq8rlAcU+1ZTZZzGYqVYhF6axB9Qg=
         # Caught by the wildcard
         opts = cf.get_options(idna.encode("テスト.ドメイン.テスト"))
         self.assertFalse(opts._verifier._verify_certs)
+
+
+def _get_ssl_context_options(ssl_context: SSL.Context) -> int:
+    """get the options bits from an openssl context object"""
+    # the OpenSSL.SSL.Context wrapper doesn't expose get_options, so we have to
+    # use the low-level interface
+    return SSL._lib.SSL_CTX_get_options(ssl_context._context)

tests/http/federation/test_matrix_federation_agent.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ from twisted.web.http_headers import Headers
 from twisted.web.iweb import IPolicyForHTTPS
 
 from synapse.config.homeserver import HomeServerConfig
-from synapse.crypto.context_factory import ClientTLSOptionsFactory
+from synapse.crypto.context_factory import FederationPolicyForHTTPS
 from synapse.http.federation.matrix_federation_agent import MatrixFederationAgent
 from synapse.http.federation.srv_resolver import Server
 from synapse.http.federation.well_known_resolver import (
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ class MatrixFederationAgentTests(unittest.TestCase):
         self._config = config = HomeServerConfig()
         config.parse_config_dict(config_dict, "", "")
 
-        self.tls_factory = ClientTLSOptionsFactory(config)
+        self.tls_factory = FederationPolicyForHTTPS(config)
 
         self.well_known_cache = TTLCache("test_cache", timer=self.reactor.seconds)
         self.had_well_known_cache = TTLCache("test_cache", timer=self.reactor.seconds)
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ class MatrixFederationAgentTests(unittest.TestCase):
         config = default_config("test", parse=True)
 
         # Build a new agent and WellKnownResolver with a different tls factory
-        tls_factory = ClientTLSOptionsFactory(config)
+        tls_factory = FederationPolicyForHTTPS(config)
         agent = MatrixFederationAgent(
             reactor=self.reactor,
             tls_client_options_factory=tls_factory,

tests/rest/admin/test_admin.py

@@ -868,6 +868,13 @@ class RoomTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase):
         self.assertEqual(200, int(channel.result["code"]), msg=channel.result["body"])
 
         # Set this new alias as the canonical alias for this room
+        self.helper.send_state(
+            room_id,
+            "m.room.aliases",
+            {"aliases": [test_alias]},
+            tok=self.admin_user_tok,
+            state_key="test",
+        )
         self.helper.send_state(
             room_id,
             "m.room.canonical_alias",

tests/rest/client/v1/test_directory.py

@@ -51,30 +51,26 @@ class DirectoryTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase):
         self.user = self.register_user("user", "test")
         self.user_tok = self.login("user", "test")
 
-    def test_cannot_set_alias_via_state_event(self):
+    def test_state_event_not_in_room(self):
-        self.ensure_user_joined_room()
+        self.ensure_user_left_room()
-        url = "/_matrix/client/r0/rooms/%s/state/m.room.aliases/%s" % (
+        self.set_alias_via_state_event(403)
-            self.room_id,
-            self.hs.hostname,
-        )
-
-        data = {"aliases": [self.random_alias(5)]}
-        request_data = json.dumps(data)
-
-        request, channel = self.make_request(
-            "PUT", url, request_data, access_token=self.user_tok
-        )
-        self.render(request)
-        self.assertEqual(channel.code, 400, channel.result)
 
     def test_directory_endpoint_not_in_room(self):
         self.ensure_user_left_room()
         self.set_alias_via_directory(403)
 
+    def test_state_event_in_room_too_long(self):
+        self.ensure_user_joined_room()
+        self.set_alias_via_state_event(400, alias_length=256)
+
     def test_directory_in_room_too_long(self):
         self.ensure_user_joined_room()
         self.set_alias_via_directory(400, alias_length=256)
 
+    def test_state_event_in_room(self):
+        self.ensure_user_joined_room()
+        self.set_alias_via_state_event(200)
+
     def test_directory_in_room(self):
         self.ensure_user_joined_room()
         self.set_alias_via_directory(200)
@@ -106,6 +102,21 @@ class DirectoryTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase):
         self.render(request)
         self.assertEqual(channel.code, 200, channel.result)
 
+    def set_alias_via_state_event(self, expected_code, alias_length=5):
+        url = "/_matrix/client/r0/rooms/%s/state/m.room.aliases/%s" % (
+            self.room_id,
+            self.hs.hostname,
+        )
+
+        data = {"aliases": [self.random_alias(alias_length)]}
+        request_data = json.dumps(data)
+
+        request, channel = self.make_request(
+            "PUT", url, request_data, access_token=self.user_tok
+        )
+        self.render(request)
+        self.assertEqual(channel.code, expected_code, channel.result)
+
     def set_alias_via_directory(self, expected_code, alias_length=5):
         url = "/_matrix/client/r0/directory/room/%s" % self.random_alias(alias_length)
         data = {"room_id": self.room_id}

tests/state/test_v2.py

@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ class TestStateResolutionStore(object):
 
         return {eid: self.event_map[eid] for eid in event_ids if eid in self.event_map}
 
-    def get_auth_chain(self, event_ids, ignore_events):
+    def _get_auth_chain(self, event_ids):
         """Gets the full auth chain for a set of events (including rejected
         events).
 
@@ -617,9 +617,6 @@ class TestStateResolutionStore(object):
         Args:
             event_ids (list): The event IDs of the events to fetch the auth
                 chain for. Must be state events.
-            ignore_events: Set of events to exclude from the returned auth
-                chain.
-
         Returns:
             Deferred[list[str]]: List of event IDs of the auth chain.
         """
@@ -629,7 +626,7 @@ class TestStateResolutionStore(object):
         stack = list(event_ids)
         while stack:
             event_id = stack.pop()
-            if event_id in result or event_id in ignore_events:
+            if event_id in result:
                 continue
 
             result.add(event_id)
@@ -639,3 +636,9 @@ class TestStateResolutionStore(object):
                 stack.append(aid)
 
         return list(result)
+
+    def get_auth_chain_difference(self, auth_sets):
+        chains = [frozenset(self._get_auth_chain(a)) for a in auth_sets]
+
+        common = set(chains[0]).intersection(*chains[1:])
+        return set(chains[0]).union(*chains[1:]) - common

tests/storage/test_event_federation.py

@@ -13,19 +13,14 @@
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 
-from twisted.internet import defer
-
 import tests.unittest
 import tests.utils
 
 
-class EventFederationWorkerStoreTestCase(tests.unittest.TestCase):
+class EventFederationWorkerStoreTestCase(tests.unittest.HomeserverTestCase):
-    @defer.inlineCallbacks
+    def prepare(self, reactor, clock, hs):
-    def setUp(self):
-        hs = yield tests.utils.setup_test_homeserver(self.addCleanup)
         self.store = hs.get_datastore()
 
-    @defer.inlineCallbacks
     def test_get_prev_events_for_room(self):
         room_id = "@ROOM:local"
 
@@ -61,15 +56,14 @@ class EventFederationWorkerStoreTestCase(tests.unittest.TestCase):
             )
 
         for i in range(0, 20):
-            yield self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i)
+            self.get_success(self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i))
 
         # this should get the last ten
-        r = yield self.store.get_prev_events_for_room(room_id)
+        r = self.get_success(self.store.get_prev_events_for_room(room_id))
         self.assertEqual(10, len(r))
         for i in range(0, 10):
             self.assertEqual("$event_%i:local" % (19 - i), r[i])
 
-    @defer.inlineCallbacks
     def test_get_rooms_with_many_extremities(self):
         room1 = "#room1"
         room2 = "#room2"
@@ -86,25 +80,154 @@ class EventFederationWorkerStoreTestCase(tests.unittest.TestCase):
             )
 
         for i in range(0, 20):
-            yield self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i, room1)
+            self.get_success(
-            yield self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i, room2)
+                self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i, room1)
-            yield self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i, room3)
+            )
+            self.get_success(
+                self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i, room2)
+            )
+            self.get_success(
+                self.store.db.runInteraction("insert", insert_event, i, room3)
+            )
 
         # Test simple case
-        r = yield self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 5, [])
+        r = self.get_success(self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 5, []))
         self.assertEqual(len(r), 3)
 
         # Does filter work?
 
-        r = yield self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 5, [room1])
+        r = self.get_success(self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 5, [room1]))
         self.assertTrue(room2 in r)
         self.assertTrue(room3 in r)
         self.assertEqual(len(r), 2)
 
-        r = yield self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 5, [room1, room2])
+        r = self.get_success(
+            self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 5, [room1, room2])
+        )
         self.assertEqual(r, [room3])
 
         # Does filter and limit work?
 
-        r = yield self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 1, [room1])
+        r = self.get_success(self.store.get_rooms_with_many_extremities(5, 1, [room1]))
         self.assertTrue(r == [room2] or r == [room3])
+
+    def test_auth_difference(self):
+        room_id = "@ROOM:local"
+
+        # The silly auth graph we use to test the auth difference algorithm,
+        # where the top are the most recent events.
+        #
+        #   A   B
+        #    \ /
+        #  D  E
+        #  \  |
+        #   ` F   C
+        #     |  /|
+        #     G ´ |
+        #     | \ |
+        #     H   I
+        #     |   |
+        #     K   J
+
+        auth_graph = {
+            "a": ["e"],
+            "b": ["e"],
+            "c": ["g", "i"],
+            "d": ["f"],
+            "e": ["f"],
+            "f": ["g"],
+            "g": ["h", "i"],
+            "h": ["k"],
+            "i": ["j"],
+            "k": [],
+            "j": [],
+        }
+
+        depth_map = {
+            "a": 7,
+            "b": 7,
+            "c": 4,
+            "d": 6,
+            "e": 6,
+            "f": 5,
+            "g": 3,
+            "h": 2,
+            "i": 2,
+            "k": 1,
+            "j": 1,
+        }
+
+        # We rudely fiddle with the appropriate tables directly, as that's much
+        # easier than constructing events properly.
+
+        def insert_event(txn, event_id, stream_ordering):
+
+            depth = depth_map[event_id]
+
+            self.store.db.simple_insert_txn(
+                txn,
+                table="events",
+                values={
+                    "event_id": event_id,
+                    "room_id": room_id,
+                    "depth": depth,
+                    "topological_ordering": depth,
+                    "type": "m.test",
+                    "processed": True,
+                    "outlier": False,
+                    "stream_ordering": stream_ordering,
+                },
+            )
+
+            self.store.db.simple_insert_many_txn(
+                txn,
+                table="event_auth",
+                values=[
+                    {"event_id": event_id, "room_id": room_id, "auth_id": a}
+                    for a in auth_graph[event_id]
+                ],
+            )
+
+        next_stream_ordering = 0
+        for event_id in auth_graph:
+            next_stream_ordering += 1
+            self.get_success(
+                self.store.db.runInteraction(
+                    "insert", insert_event, event_id, next_stream_ordering
+                )
+            )
+
+        # Now actually test that various combinations give the right result:
+
+        difference = self.get_success(
+            self.store.get_auth_chain_difference([{"a"}, {"b"}])
+        )
+        self.assertSetEqual(difference, {"a", "b"})
+
+        difference = self.get_success(
+            self.store.get_auth_chain_difference([{"a"}, {"b"}, {"c"}])
+        )
+        self.assertSetEqual(difference, {"a", "b", "c", "e", "f"})
+
+        difference = self.get_success(
+            self.store.get_auth_chain_difference([{"a", "c"}, {"b"}])
+        )
+        self.assertSetEqual(difference, {"a", "b", "c"})
+
+        difference = self.get_success(
+            self.store.get_auth_chain_difference([{"a"}, {"b"}, {"d"}])
+        )
+        self.assertSetEqual(difference, {"a", "b", "d", "e"})
+
+        difference = self.get_success(
+            self.store.get_auth_chain_difference([{"a"}, {"b"}, {"c"}, {"d"}])
+        )
+        self.assertSetEqual(difference, {"a", "b", "c", "d", "e", "f"})
+
+        difference = self.get_success(
+            self.store.get_auth_chain_difference([{"a"}, {"b"}, {"e"}])
+        )
+        self.assertSetEqual(difference, {"a", "b"})
+
+        difference = self.get_success(self.store.get_auth_chain_difference([{"a"}]))
+        self.assertSetEqual(difference, set())

tox.ini

@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ commands = mypy \
             synapse/federation/federation_client.py \
             synapse/federation/sender \
             synapse/federation/transport \
+            synapse/handlers/auth.py \
             synapse/handlers/directory.py \
             synapse/handlers/presence.py \
             synapse/handlers/sync.py \