terminal/src/cascadia/TerminalSettingsModel/FileUtils.cpp
Mike Griese c79334ffbb
Add a file for storing elevated-only state (#11222)
## Summary of the Pull Request

This creates an `elevated-state.json` that lives in `%LOCALAPPDATA%` next to `state.json`, that's only writable when elevated. It doesn't _use_ this file for anything, it just puts the framework down for use later.

It's _just like `ApplicationState`_. We'll use it the same way. 

It's readable when unelevated, which is nice, but not writable. If you're dumb and try to write to the file when unelevated, it'll just silently do nothing.

If we try opening the file and find out the permissions are different, we'll _blow the file away entirely_. This is to prevent someone from renaming the original file (which they can do unelevated), then slapping a new file that's writable by them down in it's place. 

## References
* We're going to use this in #11096, but these PRs need to be broken up.

## PR Checklist
* [x] Closes nothing
* [x] I work here
* [x] Tests added/passed
* [ ] Requires documentation to be updated - maybe? not sure we have docs on `state.json` at all yet

## Validation Steps Performed
I've played with this much more in `dev/migrie/f/non-terminal-content-elevation-warning`

###### followed by #11308, #11310
2021-11-13 01:58:43 +01:00

290 lines
13 KiB
C++

// Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
// Licensed under the MIT license.
#include "pch.h"
#include "FileUtils.h"
#include <appmodel.h>
#include <shlobj.h>
#include <WtExeUtils.h>
#include <aclapi.h>
#include <sddl.h>
#include <wil/token_helpers.h>
static constexpr std::string_view Utf8Bom{ u8"\uFEFF" };
static constexpr std::wstring_view UnpackagedSettingsFolderName{ L"Microsoft\\Windows Terminal\\" };
namespace winrt::Microsoft::Terminal::Settings::Model
{
// Returns a path like C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Packages\<packagename>\LocalState
// You can put your settings.json or state.json in this directory.
std::filesystem::path GetBaseSettingsPath()
{
static std::filesystem::path baseSettingsPath = []() {
wil::unique_cotaskmem_string localAppDataFolder;
// KF_FLAG_FORCE_APP_DATA_REDIRECTION, when engaged, causes SHGet... to return
// the new AppModel paths (Packages/xxx/RoamingState, etc.) for standard path requests.
// Using this flag allows us to avoid Windows.Storage.ApplicationData completely.
THROW_IF_FAILED(SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_LocalAppData, KF_FLAG_FORCE_APP_DATA_REDIRECTION, nullptr, &localAppDataFolder));
std::filesystem::path parentDirectoryForSettingsFile{ localAppDataFolder.get() };
if (!IsPackaged())
{
parentDirectoryForSettingsFile /= UnpackagedSettingsFolderName;
}
// Create the directory if it doesn't exist
std::filesystem::create_directories(parentDirectoryForSettingsFile);
return parentDirectoryForSettingsFile;
}();
return baseSettingsPath;
}
// Function Description:
// - Checks the permissions on this file, to make sure it can only be opened
// for writing by admins. We will be checking to see if the file is owned
// by the Builtin\Administrators group. If it's not, then it was likely
// tampered with.
// Arguments:
// - handle: a HANDLE to the file to check
// Return Value:
// - true if it had the expected permissions. False otherwise.
static bool _isOwnedByAdministrators(const HANDLE& handle)
{
// If the file is owned by the administrators group, trust the
// administrators instead of checking the DACL permissions. It's simpler
// and more flexible.
wil::unique_hlocal_security_descriptor sd;
PSID psidOwner{ nullptr };
// The psidOwner pointer references the security descriptor, so it
// doesn't have to be freed separate from sd.
const auto status = GetSecurityInfo(handle,
SE_FILE_OBJECT,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
&psidOwner,
nullptr,
nullptr,
nullptr,
wil::out_param_ptr<PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*>(sd));
THROW_IF_WIN32_ERROR(status);
wil::unique_any_psid psidAdmins{ nullptr };
THROW_IF_WIN32_BOOL_FALSE(
ConvertStringSidToSidW(L"BA", wil::out_param_ptr<PSID*>(psidAdmins)));
return EqualSid(psidOwner, psidAdmins.get());
}
// Tries to read a file somewhat atomically without locking it.
// Strips the UTF8 BOM if it exists.
std::string ReadUTF8File(const std::filesystem::path& path, const bool elevatedOnly)
{
// From some casual observations we can determine that:
// * ReadFile() always returns the requested amount of data (unless the file is smaller)
// * It's unlikely that the file was changed between GetFileSize() and ReadFile()
// -> Lets add a retry-loop just in case, to not fail if the file size changed while reading.
for (int i = 0; i < 3; ++i)
{
wil::unique_hfile file{ CreateFileW(path.c_str(),
GENERIC_READ,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
nullptr,
OPEN_EXISTING,
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
nullptr) };
THROW_LAST_ERROR_IF(!file);
// Open the file _first_, then check if it has the right
// permissions. This prevents a "Time-of-check to time-of-use"
// vulnerability where a malicious exe could delete the file and
// replace it between us checking the permissions, and reading the
// contents. We've got a handle to the file now, which means we're
// going to read the contents of that instance of the file
// regardless. If someone replaces the file on us before we get to
// the GetSecurityInfo call below, then only the subsequent call to
// ReadUTF8File will notice it.
if (elevatedOnly)
{
const bool hadExpectedPermissions{ _isOwnedByAdministrators(file.get()) };
if (!hadExpectedPermissions)
{
// Close the handle
file.reset();
// delete the file. It's been compromised.
LOG_LAST_ERROR_IF(!DeleteFile(path.c_str()));
// Exit early, because obviously there's nothing to read from the deleted file.
return "";
}
}
const auto fileSize = GetFileSize(file.get(), nullptr);
THROW_LAST_ERROR_IF(fileSize == INVALID_FILE_SIZE);
// By making our buffer just slightly larger we can detect if
// the file size changed and we've failed to read the full file.
std::string buffer(static_cast<size_t>(fileSize) + 1, '\0');
DWORD bytesRead = 0;
THROW_IF_WIN32_BOOL_FALSE(ReadFile(file.get(), buffer.data(), gsl::narrow<DWORD>(buffer.size()), &bytesRead, nullptr));
// This implementation isn't atomic as we'd need to use an exclusive file lock.
// But this would be annoying for users as it forces them to close the file in their editor.
// The next best alternative is to at least try to detect file changes and retry the read.
if (bytesRead != fileSize)
{
// This continue is unlikely to be hit (see the prior for loop comment).
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(100));
continue;
}
// As mentioned before our buffer was allocated oversized.
buffer.resize(bytesRead);
if (til::starts_with(buffer, Utf8Bom))
{
// Yeah this memmove()s the entire content.
// But I don't really want to deal with UTF8 BOMs any more than necessary,
// as basically not a single editor writes a BOM for UTF8.
buffer.erase(0, Utf8Bom.size());
}
return buffer;
}
THROW_WIN32_MSG(ERROR_READ_FAULT, "file size changed while reading");
}
// Same as ReadUTF8File, but returns an empty optional, if the file couldn't be opened.
std::optional<std::string> ReadUTF8FileIfExists(const std::filesystem::path& path, const bool elevatedOnly)
{
try
{
return { ReadUTF8File(path, elevatedOnly) };
}
catch (const wil::ResultException& exception)
{
if (exception.GetErrorCode() == HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND))
{
return {};
}
throw;
}
}
void WriteUTF8File(const std::filesystem::path& path,
const std::string_view& content,
const bool elevatedOnly)
{
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa;
// stash the security descriptor here, so it will stay in context until
// after the call to CreateFile. If it gets cleaned up before that, then
// CreateFile will fail
wil::unique_hlocal_security_descriptor sd;
if (elevatedOnly)
{
// Initialize the security descriptor so only admins can write the
// file. We'll initialize the SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR with a
// single entry (ACE) -- a mandatory label (i.e. a
// LABEL_SECURITY_INFORMATION) that sets the file integrity level to
// "high", with a no-write-up policy.
//
// When accessed from a security context at a lower integrity level,
// the no-write-up policy filters out rights that aren't in the
// object type's generic read and execute set (for the file type,
// that's FILE_GENERIC_READ | FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE).
//
// Another option we considered here was manually setting the ACLs
// on this file such that Builtin\Admins could read&write the file,
// and all users could only read.
//
// Big thanks to @eryksun in GH#11222 for helping with this. This
// alternative method was chosen because it's considerably simpler.
// The required security descriptor can be created easily from the
// SDDL string: "S:(ML;;NW;;;HI)"
// (i.e. SACL:mandatory label;;no write up;;;high integrity level)
unsigned long cb;
THROW_IF_WIN32_BOOL_FALSE(
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptor(L"S:(ML;;NW;;;HI)",
SDDL_REVISION_1,
wil::out_param_ptr<PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*>(sd),
&cb));
// Initialize a security attributes structure.
sa.nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES);
sa.lpSecurityDescriptor = sd.get();
sa.bInheritHandle = false;
// If we're running in an elevated context, when this file is
// created, it will automatically be owned by
// Builtin\Administrators, which will pass the above
// _isOwnedByAdministrators check.
//
// Programs running in an elevated context will be free to write the
// file, and unelevated processes will be able to read the file. An
// unelevated process could always delete the file and rename a new
// file in it's place (a la the way `vim.exe` saves files), but if
// they do that, the new file _won't_ be owned by Administrators,
// failing the above check.
}
wil::unique_hfile file{ CreateFileW(path.c_str(),
GENERIC_WRITE,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
elevatedOnly ? &sa : nullptr,
CREATE_ALWAYS,
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
nullptr) };
THROW_LAST_ERROR_IF(!file);
const auto fileSize = gsl::narrow<DWORD>(content.size());
DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
THROW_IF_WIN32_BOOL_FALSE(WriteFile(file.get(), content.data(), fileSize, &bytesWritten, nullptr));
if (bytesWritten != fileSize)
{
THROW_WIN32_MSG(ERROR_WRITE_FAULT, "failed to write whole file");
}
}
void WriteUTF8FileAtomic(const std::filesystem::path& path,
const std::string_view& content)
{
// GH#10787: rename() will replace symbolic links themselves and not the path they point at.
// It's thus important that we first resolve them before generating temporary path.
std::error_code ec;
const auto resolvedPath = std::filesystem::is_symlink(path) ? std::filesystem::canonical(path, ec) : path;
if (ec)
{
if (ec.value() != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
{
THROW_WIN32_MSG(ec.value(), "failed to compute canonical path");
}
// The original file is a symbolic link, but the target doesn't exist.
// Consider two fall-backs:
// * resolve the link manually, which might be less accurate and more prone to race conditions
// * write to the file directly, which lets the system resolve the symbolic link but leaves the write non-atomic
// The latter is chosen, as this is an edge case and our 'atomic' writes are only best-effort.
WriteUTF8File(path, content);
return;
}
auto tmpPath = resolvedPath;
tmpPath += L".tmp";
// Writing to a file isn't atomic, but...
WriteUTF8File(tmpPath, content);
// renaming one is (supposed to be) atomic.
// Wait... "supposed to be"!? Well it's technically not always atomic,
// but it's pretty darn close to it, so... better than nothing.
std::filesystem::rename(tmpPath, resolvedPath);
}
}