1905 lines
61 KiB
C
1905 lines
61 KiB
C
/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */
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/*
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* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
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* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#define USE_SOCKETS
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
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static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
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{
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int ret, sat, brw, i;
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if (sizeof(long) == 8)
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do {
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const union {
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long one;
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char little;
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} is_endian = {
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1
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};
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long l;
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if (is_endian.little)
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break;
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/* not reached on little-endians */
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/*
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* following test is redundant, because input is always aligned,
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* but I take no chances...
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*/
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if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
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break;
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l = *((long *)v1);
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l -= *((long *)v2);
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if (l > 128)
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return 128;
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else if (l < -128)
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return -128;
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else
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return (int)l;
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} while (0);
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ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
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sat = 0;
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brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
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if (ret & 0x80) {
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for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
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brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
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sat |= ~brw;
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brw >>= 8;
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}
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} else {
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for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
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brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
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sat |= brw;
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brw >>= 8;
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}
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}
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brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
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if (sat & 0xff)
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return brw | 0x80;
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else
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return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
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}
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static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
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int len, int peek);
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static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
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static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
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static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
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unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
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#if 0
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static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
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unsigned short *priority,
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unsigned long *offset);
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#endif
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static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
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unsigned char *priority);
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static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
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/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
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static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
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{
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
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rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
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if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
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s->packet = rdata->packet;
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s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
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memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
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memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
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/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
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memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
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return (1);
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}
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static int
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dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
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{
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
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pitem *item;
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/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
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if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
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return 0;
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rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
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item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
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if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
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if (rdata != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(rdata);
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if (item != NULL)
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pitem_free(item);
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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rdata->packet = s->packet;
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rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
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memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
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memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
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item->data = rdata;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
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if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
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(s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
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|| s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
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BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
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sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
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}
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#endif
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s->packet = NULL;
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s->packet_length = 0;
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memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
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memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
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OPENSSL_free(rdata);
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pitem_free(item);
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return (-1);
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}
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/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
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if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
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OPENSSL_free(rdata);
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pitem_free(item);
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return (-1);
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}
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return (1);
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}
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static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
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{
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pitem *item;
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item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
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if (item) {
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dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
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OPENSSL_free(item->data);
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pitem_free(item);
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return (1);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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|
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/*
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* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
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* processed yet
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*/
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#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
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dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
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&((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
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/*
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* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
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* processed
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*/
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#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
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dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
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&((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
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static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
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{
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pitem *item;
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item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
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if (item) {
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/* Check if epoch is current. */
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if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
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return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
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|
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/* Process all the records. */
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while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
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dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
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if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
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return (0);
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if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
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s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
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return -1;
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}
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}
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|
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/*
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* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
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* processed
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*/
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s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
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s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
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return (1);
|
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}
|
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|
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#if 0
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|
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static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
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{
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pitem *item;
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PQ_64BIT priority =
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(((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
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((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
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|
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/* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */
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if (!SSL_in_init(s))
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return 0;
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|
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item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
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if (item && item->priority == priority) {
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/*
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* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a
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* handshake record, since data records as passed up without
|
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* buffering
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*/
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
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item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
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rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
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|
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if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
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s->packet = rdata->packet;
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s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
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memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
|
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memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
|
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|
|
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
|
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pitem_free(item);
|
|
|
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/* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
|
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return (1);
|
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}
|
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|
|
return 0;
|
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}
|
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|
|
#endif
|
|
|
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static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
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int i, al;
|
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int enc_err;
|
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SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
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unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
|
|
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
|
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sess = s->session;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
|
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* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
|
|
*/
|
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rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
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* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
|
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* at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
|
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* the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
|
|
* the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
|
|
* bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* check is not needed I believe */
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
|
|
rr->data = rr->input;
|
|
|
|
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
|
|
/*-
|
|
* enc_err is:
|
|
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
|
|
* 1: if the padding is valid
|
|
* -1: if the padding is invalid
|
|
*/
|
|
if (enc_err == 0) {
|
|
/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
|
|
if ((sess != NULL) &&
|
|
(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
|
|
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
|
|
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
|
|
*/
|
|
orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
|
|
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
|
|
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
|
|
* of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (orig_len < mac_size ||
|
|
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
|
|
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
|
|
orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
|
|
* constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
|
|
* constant time from within the record, without leaking the
|
|
* contents of the padding bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
mac = mac_tmp;
|
|
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
|
|
rr->length -= mac_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
|
|
* |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
|
|
* |mac_size| above.
|
|
*/
|
|
rr->length -= mac_size;
|
|
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
|
|
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
|
|
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
|
|
enc_err = -1;
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
|
|
enc_err = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (enc_err < 0) {
|
|
/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* r->length is now just compressed */
|
|
if (s->expand != NULL) {
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
|
|
SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
/*-
|
|
* So at this point the following is true
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
|
|
* after use :-).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Call this to get a new input record.
|
|
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
|
|
* or non-blocking IO.
|
|
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
|
|
int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
|
|
int i, n;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
unsigned char *p = NULL;
|
|
unsigned short version;
|
|
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
|
|
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
|
|
|
|
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
|
|
* This is a non-blocking operation.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
|
|
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* get something from the wire */
|
|
again:
|
|
/* check if we have the header */
|
|
if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
|
|
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
|
|
n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
|
|
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
|
|
|
|
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
|
|
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
|
|
|
|
p = s->packet;
|
|
|
|
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
|
|
rr->type = *(p++);
|
|
ssl_major = *(p++);
|
|
ssl_minor = *(p++);
|
|
version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
|
|
|
|
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
|
|
n2s(p, rr->epoch);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
|
|
p += 6;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, rr->length);
|
|
|
|
/* Lets check version */
|
|
if (!s->first_packet) {
|
|
if (version != s->version) {
|
|
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
|
|
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
|
|
/* record too long, silently discard it */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
|
|
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
|
|
i = rr->length;
|
|
n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
|
|
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
|
|
if (n != i) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
|
|
* DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
|
|
|
|
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
|
|
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
|
|
if (bitmap == NULL) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
|
|
goto again; /* get another record */
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
|
|
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
|
|
* we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
|
|
* as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
|
|
* connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
|
|
s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
|
|
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
|
|
goto again; /* get another record */
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* just read a 0 length packet */
|
|
if (rr->length == 0)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
|
|
* handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
|
|
* processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
|
|
* listening.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_next_epoch) {
|
|
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
|
|
if (dtls1_buffer_record
|
|
(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
/* Mark receipt of record. */
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
|
|
}
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
|
|
goto again; /* get another record */
|
|
}
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
|
|
* 'type' is one of the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
|
|
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
|
|
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
|
|
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
|
|
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
|
|
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
|
|
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
|
|
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
|
|
* Change cipher spec protocol
|
|
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
|
|
* Alert protocol
|
|
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
|
|
* Handshake protocol
|
|
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
|
|
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
|
|
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
|
|
* Application data protocol
|
|
* none of our business
|
|
*/
|
|
int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
int al, i, j, ret;
|
|
unsigned int n;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
|
|
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
|
|
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
|
|
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
|
|
* SCTP.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
|
|
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
|
|
(s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
|
|
|| s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)
|
|
&& s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
|
|
#else
|
|
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
start:
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
|
|
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
|
|
pitem *item;
|
|
item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
|
|
if (item) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
|
|
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for timeout */
|
|
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
|
|
goto start;
|
|
|
|
/* get new packet if necessary */
|
|
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
|
|
ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
|
|
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
else
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
|
|
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
|
|
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
|
|
* the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
|
|
* data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) <
|
|
0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
|
|
* 'peek' mode)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
|
|
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
|
|
/*
|
|
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
|
|
* doing a handshake for the first time
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
|
|
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0)
|
|
return (len);
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
|
|
n = rr->length;
|
|
else
|
|
n = (unsigned int)len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
|
|
if (!peek) {
|
|
rr->length -= n;
|
|
rr->off += n;
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
|
|
* data first, so retry.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
|
|
rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
(s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
|
|
|| s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
|
|
* app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
|
|
* anymore, finally set shutdown.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
|
|
s->d1->shutdown_received
|
|
&& !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return (n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
|
|
* then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
|
|
* that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
|
|
} else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
|
|
dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
|
else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
|
|
dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
|
|
|
|
/* Exit and notify application to read again */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
|
|
else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
|
|
* reading.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
|
|
* fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
|
|
#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
|
|
/*
|
|
* for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
|
|
* dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
|
|
* non-existing alert...
|
|
*/
|
|
FIX ME
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
|
|
dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
|
|
rr->length--;
|
|
}
|
|
*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
|
|
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
|
|
if ((!s->server) &&
|
|
(s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
|
|
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
|
|
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
|
|
s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
|
|
!s->s3->renegotiate) {
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
|
|
s->new_session = 1;
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
|
|
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the case where we try to read application data,
|
|
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
|
|
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
|
|
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
|
|
* again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
|
|
*/
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
|
|
int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
|
|
int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
|
|
|
|
s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
|
|
s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
|
|
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
|
|
* after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
|
|
* that nothing gets discarded.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
|
|
BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
|
|
/* now check if it's a missing record */
|
|
if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
|
|
unsigned short seq;
|
|
unsigned int frag_off;
|
|
unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, seq);
|
|
n2l3(p, frag_off);
|
|
|
|
dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
|
|
dtls1_get_queue_priority
|
|
(frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
|
|
&found);
|
|
if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
|
|
* ourselves
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
|
|
DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
char tmp[16];
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
|
|
SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
|
|
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
|
|
* shutdown */
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
|
|
unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
ccs_hdr_len = 3;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
|
|
* what the record payload has to look like
|
|
*/
|
|
/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
|
|
if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
|
|
(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
|
|
i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
|
|
rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
|
|
* are still missing, so just drop it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
|
|
* SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
|
|
* SCTP is used
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
|
|
!s->in_handshake) {
|
|
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
/* this may just be a stale retransmit */
|
|
dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
|
|
if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
|
|
* here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
|
|
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
|
|
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
|
|
* are not as expected (and because this is
|
|
* not really needed for clients except for
|
|
* detecting protocol violations): */
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
|
|
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
s->new_session = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
|
|
* trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
|
|
* option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
|
|
* problems in the blocking world
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (rr->type) {
|
|
default:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
|
|
/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
|
|
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
|
|
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
|
|
* happen when type != rr->type
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
|
|
* application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
|
|
* (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
|
|
* application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
|
|
* started), we will indulge it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
|
|
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
|
|
(((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
|
|
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
|
|
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
|
) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
|
|
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
|
|
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
|
)
|
|
)) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* not reached */
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading
|
|
* belated app data with SCTP.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
|
|
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
|
|
(s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
|
|
|| s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
|
|
#else
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
|
|
* is started.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
|
|
int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
|
|
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
|
|
unsigned char *dst = buf;
|
|
unsigned int k, n;
|
|
|
|
/* peek == 0 */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
|
|
*dst++ = *src++;
|
|
len--;
|
|
s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
|
|
s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
|
|
* not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *pseq;
|
|
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
|
|
int prefix_len = 0;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
int bs;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
|
|
* will happen with non blocking IO
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
|
|
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
|
|
wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
|
|
sess = s->session;
|
|
|
|
if ((sess == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
|
|
clear = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (clear)
|
|
mac_size = 0;
|
|
else {
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
|
|
if (mac_size < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/*
|
|
* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
|
|
&& SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
|
|
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
|
|
* prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
|
|
* 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
|
|
* payload)
|
|
*/
|
|
prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
|
|
if (prefix_len <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->wbuf.len <
|
|
(size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
|
|
/* insufficient space */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
|
|
|
|
/* write the header */
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = type & 0xff;
|
|
wr->type = type;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
|
|
pseq = p;
|
|
p += 10;
|
|
|
|
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. (this is a bit of a
|
|
* boundary violation, but what the heck).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
|
|
(EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
|
|
bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
|
|
else
|
|
bs = 0;
|
|
|
|
wr->data = p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
|
|
wr->length = (int)len;
|
|
wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* first we compress */
|
|
if (s->compress != NULL) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
|
|
wr->input = wr->data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
|
|
* wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
|
|
* wb->buf
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mac_size != 0) {
|
|
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1) < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
wr->length += mac_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* this is true regardless of mac size */
|
|
wr->input = p;
|
|
wr->data = p;
|
|
|
|
/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
|
|
if (bs) { /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
|
|
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, bs);
|
|
/*
|
|
* master IV and last CBC residue stand for the rest of randomness
|
|
*/
|
|
wr->length += bs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* record length after mac and block padding */
|
|
/*
|
|
* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
|
|
* SSL_in_init(s)))
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
|
|
|
|
s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: ?? */
|
|
/*
|
|
* else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
|
|
pseq += 6;
|
|
s2n(wr->length, pseq);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
|
|
* wr->length long
|
|
*/
|
|
wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
|
|
wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
|
|
/* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
|
|
dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
|
|
*((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
|
|
|
|
if (create_empty_fragment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
|
|
* out anything here
|
|
*/
|
|
return wr->length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now let's set up wb */
|
|
wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
|
|
wb->offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
|
|
* retries later
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_type = type;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
|
|
|
|
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
|
|
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
|
|
err:
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
|
|
{
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
unsigned int shift;
|
|
const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
|
|
|
|
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
|
|
if (cmp > 0) {
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
|
|
return 1; /* this record in new */
|
|
}
|
|
shift = -cmp;
|
|
if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
|
|
return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
|
|
else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
|
|
return 0; /* record previously received */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
|
|
{
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
unsigned int shift;
|
|
const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
|
|
|
|
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
|
|
if (cmp > 0) {
|
|
shift = cmp;
|
|
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
|
|
bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
|
|
else
|
|
bitmap->map = 1UL;
|
|
memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
|
|
} else {
|
|
shift = -cmp;
|
|
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
|
|
bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
|
|
*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
|
|
*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
|
|
if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
|
|
s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
|
|
# if 0
|
|
if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
|
|
/*
|
|
* waiting for a new msg
|
|
*/
|
|
else
|
|
s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# if 0
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
|
|
# endif
|
|
l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
/* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
|
|
#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
|
|
|| s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
|
|
#endif
|
|
)
|
|
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
|
|
2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
|
|
unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*is_next_epoch = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
|
|
if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
|
|
return &s->d1->bitmap;
|
|
|
|
/* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
|
|
else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
|
|
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
|
|
*is_next_epoch = 1;
|
|
return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
static int
|
|
dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
|
|
unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* alerts are passed up immediately */
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that
|
|
* Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s)) {
|
|
unsigned char *data = rr->data;
|
|
/* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
|
|
rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
unsigned short seq_num;
|
|
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
|
|
struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
|
|
seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
|
|
*offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
|
|
} else {
|
|
dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
|
|
seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
|
|
*offset = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of
|
|
* something we happened to previously receive (higher layers
|
|
* will drop the repeat silently
|
|
*/
|
|
if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
|
|
msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
|
|
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
|
|
msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else {
|
|
*priority = seq_num;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else /* unknown record type */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *seq;
|
|
unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
|
|
|
|
if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
|
|
seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
|
|
s->d1->r_epoch++;
|
|
memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
|
|
memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
|
|
} else {
|
|
seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
|
|
memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq,
|
|
sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
|
|
s->d1->w_epoch++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
|
|
}
|